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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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15 APRIL 1987

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SWISS OFFICER ON INTEREST, PARTICIPATION IN SDI

Zurich DIE WELTWOCHE in German 19 Feb 87 p 47

[Article by Josef Feldmann: "Disarmament and SDI: What Is the Outlook for Switzerland ?--Greater Security or Greater Danger ?"]

[Text] Ever since the Reykjavik summit, the disarmament debate has not abated. For a small, neutral country in Europe the moves on the international chessboard are of paramount importance because they have an immediate impact on its security. In this article, Corps Commandant Josef Feldmann, the commanding officer of the FAK 4, presents the Swiss point of view and at the same time looks into the opportunities for our industry to take part in SDI.

The eighties started out with a cold period in the relationship between the dominant powers. They reached their lowest ebb in the late fall of 1983 when the Soviets walked out of the Geneva disarmament talks and NATO was getting ready to implement the modernization resolution.

Since that time, a certain change of direction has taken place but it is hard to tell where it will lead. It is characterized by a flood of disarmament and confidence-building proposals ranging from initiatives for new negotiating frameworks all the way to the improvisations at Reykjavik.

One is tempted to speak of a phase of "deceptive detente."

There are only a very few clear outlines that can be made out in this strategic landscape which is difficult to survey. There are two facts which are of some significance, however.

The situation with regard to the Euro-strategic weapons is extremely complicated. When the INF negotiations in Geneva started and the initial object was merely to balance off the SS-20s against NATO's Pershing IIs and cruise missiles, the zero option seemed to be acceptable to all concerned. But since that time new types of missiles have been deployed on the territory of the GDR and Czechoslovakia, a fact which has seriously complicated the situation and the assessment of possible scenarios. These missiles are usually referred to as short-range weapons although some of them have a range of up to 900 kilometers. The issue here is not only that new nuclear weapons systems have been moved into the Western glacis of the Soviet Union but also that

these new types of missiles are extremely accurate and thus capable of delivering conventional or chemical warheads to the potential target area. [FRG] Defense Minister Woerner has felt called upon to predict that the Soviets are trying to achieve "a conventional strike capability which in effect would be tantamount to a strategic strike capability." This is a good enough reason for grave concern among the Europeans (and the West Germans in particular) about the American inclination to remove the medium-range weapons which were reluctantly accepted in the first place.

SDI, the Strategic Defense Initiative, also referred to as "Star Wars," plays a central role in the disarmament debate. To be sure, there has been a flood of initiatives for new negotiations and proposals for new disarmament formulas but so far every concrete attempt at arms limitation has run afoul of the fact that the Soviet Union has made any progress dependent on abandonment of SDI or at least of SDI development beyond the laboratory stage. The Americans, for their part, have staunchly refused to accede to this demand. This circumstance bears watching.

But what about SDI ? Ever since President Reagan called on the American scientific community in March 1983 to render enemy nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete," the project has met with a great deal of suspicion and criticism. By this time, of course, there is no longer any talk of an impenetrable defense shield in outer space. Testifying before the Armed Services Committee of the U.S. Senate recently, Defense Secretary Weinberger explained that a missile defense system developed under SDI would serve to strengthen deterrence but not take its place. What this means in plain English is that for the time being it will only be possible to protect strategically important targets with the help of sector-effective defense systems. But even this, SDI supporters believe, would make planning for a nuclear first strike so difficult that a potential enemy would consider it to be too risky.

The fact that the Soviets are making such a determined effort to bring SDI down would seem to indicate that they take this particular argument seriously.

European skepticism and the fear that the development of an effective defense system against intercontinental missiles might cause the Americans to withdraw to "Fortress America" on the basis of their newly won security and leave the Old World to its own devices seems by now to have largely dissipated. Defense Minister Woerner, at any rate, feels that "European concerns are now being taken into account in an appropriate fashion, following an initial period of intense concentration on America." What this means in concrete terms is that the present design of the research program assigns an appropriate role to procedures aimed at intercepting intermediate-range and short-range missiles, i.e. the types of weapons which pose a primary threat to Europe. Addressing this subject, GEN Franz Josef Schulze, the former supreme commander of NATO forces in Central Europe, has said that "there are many indications of the fact that the deployment of an intermediate-range missile defense system in Europe could be carried out in a relatively short period of time both for technological and political reasons. The required technologies are relatively far advanced. In contrast to defense systems against strategic missiles, these technologies are not subject to the provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty."

It is of particular interest to the Europeans that some of the technologies researched as part of the SDI program may well be useful in opening up new avenues in conventional defense. This is one reason why there is no need to fear that conflicts of interest will arise between SDI and the efforts (particularly on the part of GEN Rogers) which are aimed at a more effective conventional defense in Europe.

Non-participation [in SDI] could have an adverse effect both for strategic and economic reasons. This line of reasoning, in fact, seems to have softened the adamantly negative French position on the issue. It is worth noting in any event that prior to his election as minister president, Jacques Chirac was quoted by LE MONDE as saying that it is "utterly unproductive to adopt a position of sterile hostility vis-a-vis SDI" and to keep French companies from enhancing their own capabilities by taking part in the project.

In that sense, SDI is of concern to Switzerland as well of course. To be sure, we are far removed from the levers which control SDI research activities and because of our policy of neutrality this will not change. But if the program does come up with concrete results, Switzerland would be affected in a variety of ways. An effective shield against the Soviet missiles which pose a threat to Western Europe would enhance our security as well--without our doing anything about it on our own. But if, on the other hand, the Soviets were to succeed in neutralizing the Western intermediate-range weapons with the help of their defense system (or if these weapons were negotiated away in the absence of an appropriate trade-off), then that part of Europe which includes Switzerland would be exposed to a more serious threat by the conventional armed forces potential of the Soviet power bloc. This risk can only be countered, if the dam raised by Western conventional defensive strength remains strong enough to dash the hopes of any aggressive power of mounting a successful attack below the nuclear threshold. In his risk analysis, any potential aggressor would have to take account of the entire range of forces arrayed in the area of his objectives. Under these circumstances, the potential of the Swiss armed forces would also have to be taken into account even though they are not part of any military bloc and their only mission is to defend Swiss soil.

But SDI also raises the question of whether the program opens up interesting possibilities for Swiss industry. It is obvious that a treaty of cooperation at the government level such as five other nations have already concluded is out of the question in our case.

In other words, Swiss participation is conceivable only in the sense of having individual companies join in, if they have something of interest to offer. This type of arrangement would scarcely be any different from one worked out on the government level, since the private sector in our country by and large funds its own research and development programs anyway and thus does not depend on government agencies and decisions. But on the other hand any type of cooperation on a partnership basis would also be ruled out under these circumstances. It is more likely that the business relationship would be guided by what a high-ranking SDI project manager is reported to have said, i.e. "we will buy from you what we need."

To be sure, there are a number of things that could be bought in Switzerland. A review of all the SDI research activities indicates that Swiss firms would have some interesting items to offer in three of the five main areas, i.e. precision mechanics, optics, optronics, metrology and materials technology, to name but a few.

Viewed in this light, the military technology aspect should not be underestimated. This is a point also made by Kiel [FRG] political scientist, Prof Kaltefleiter. "A number of technologies which may be developed for the purposes of strategic defense could assume some importance in conventional defense," he writes. "Laser systems and electromagnetic cannons might become tomorrow's antitank weapons; computers used to coordinate the defense against thousands of warheads and decoys will make it possible to construct fire control systems for conventional weapons of hitherto unimaginable speed."

Such perspectives for the future not only apply "to the others." As opposed to them, Swiss technology is entirely out of place when we take the capabilities of our own high technology industry into account. There are, in fact, a great many possibilities for putting technical know-how and familiarity with modern technology to use in the future development of our armed forces. The capabilities of Swiss industry make it incumbent on us to do our utmost to profit from this. In addition, we should keep an even more important tenet in mind which is that we must not let a single opportunity go by in our military preparedness program to make use of technology in order to save lives.

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CSO: 5200/2509

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

XINHUA VIEWS U.S. DEMOCRATS' STAND ON STAR WARS

OW191251 Beijing XINHUA in English 1037 GMT 13 Mar 87

["Round-up: U.S. Democrats Ganging Up on Early Star Wars Deployment" — XINHUA headline]

[Text] Washington, March 18 (XINHUA) — The long debate on how the United States is going to interpret the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty is heating up, threatening the Reagan administration's efforts to speed up testing and deployment of the "Star Wars" missile defense technologies.

At issue is the administration's assertion that under a broader interpretation of the treaty it developed October 1985, the U.S. can expand testing and deploy the system without violating the treaty.

It also argues its new interpretation was supported by the treaty's negotiation records, making it "legally correct".

But many congressmen say the administration's view was baseless. The U.S. should adhere to the restrictive interpretation which ban systems like the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), they say.

The most vigorous challenge comes from Democratic Senator Sam Nunn, chairman of the powerful Senate Arms Services Committee. Nunn was generally seen as a staunch supporter of President Reagan's arms build-up.

Nunn prepared a 98-page analysis of the negotiation, ratification and implementation records of the ABM Treaty which he unveiled in a series of Senate speeches last week.

There are a "a series of authoritative statements" that "flatly and unequivocally contradicted" the administration's view, he said.

The record shows the Senate's ratification of the treaty in 1972 was explicitly based on a restrictive interpretation of the pact, he explained.

Since then, four U.S. administrations supported that interpretation until a new reading was found in 1985, he added.

Reagan's interpretation is grounded in "ideologically driven" assessments, the Senator said.

Nunn's view was echoed by leading Democratic Senators such as Claiborne Pell, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Joseph Biden, chairman of the Judiciary Committee.

William Fulbright, who was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the debate on the treaty, agrees with Nunn.

The challenge has now spread to a related issue of whether the Congress should make further cuts in the money for SDI, a cornerstone of President Reagan's arms control strategy.

Nunn has warned the administration it faces a confrontation over money if it continues to insist on its broader interpretation.

"The bottom line is that Reagan will have to adhere to the traditional interpretation or see SDI funding cut dramatically from current levels," said Democratic Senator Carl Levin, another critic of Reagan's treaty review.

Some republican Congressmen, including Representative Jack Kemp, a leading supporter of SDI, are afraid the strong opposition might delay SDI deployment well into the next administration.

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CSO: 5200/4069

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

CPSU, BRITISH CP DISCUSS REYKJAVIK PROPOSALS

LD2619J4 Moscow TASS in English 1912 GMT 26 Feb 87

[Excerpt] Moscow February 26 TASS--On February 25, 1987 a meeting took place at the Central Committee of the CPSU between representatives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of Great Britain.

Participants from the CPSU were A.F. Dobrynin, secretary of the CC CPSU and V.V. Zagladin, member, CC CPSU, first deputy-head, International Department, CC CPSU, first deputy-head, International Department, CC CPSU.

Gordon McLennan, general secretary, and Gerry Pocock, head of International Department, represented the CPGB.

Joint Communique of the Representatives of the CPSU and CPGB.

The representatives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of Great Britain discussed the international situation and the prospects for disarmament following the meeting in Reykjavik between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan.

Preventing a nuclear war is the supreme issue before humanity. The Communist Parties of the Soviet Union and Great Britain recognise the great responsibility the peoples of both countries have in the present dangerous and complicated world situation.

A special responsibility for ending the arms race and the threat of nuclear war lay with the five nuclear weapons powers. Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Great Britain could make an important contribution to disarmament.

Both parties believe that the programme for achieving world-wide nuclear disarmament before the end of the century, put forward by the Soviet Union on January 15, 1986, is a realisable one. But there are militaristic forces in the world which are doing their utmost to sabotage any steps towards achieving it.

It is these forces, influential in the United States and also in Britain, which have thwarted initiatives aimed at reducing international tension and ending the arms race. They refused to respond to the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests operated by the Soviet Union. They were responsible for dashing the high hopes aroused by the Reykjavik meeting and discussions there on reducing, and then eliminating nuclear weapons.

The CPSU and CPGB are in favour of the implementation of the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union in Reykjavik.

British communists are active participants in the peace movement in Britain which campaigns for unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain, the closure of U.S. bases and the immediate removal of cruise missiles.

The unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons tests by the Soviet Union responded to the appeals voiced by peoples and peace movements throughout the world. There is an urgent need for intensified campaigning on testing in order to bring about a complete ban.

Mikhail Gorbachev declared in his talks with a British parliamentary delegation in May 1986 that if Britain officially decides to scrap its nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union will be prepared to reduce its nuclear potential accordingly, and that if Britain simultaneously removes foreign nuclear weapons from its territory, the Soviet Union will guarantee that its nuclear weapons will not be targeted at British territory and will never be used against Britain.

Such steps by our two countries would be a major contribution to peace and disarmament.

Agreement between Britain and the Soviet Union on opposition to any undermining of the ABM treaty would also be of great significance. The U.S. plans for speeding up the development of the SDI (Star Wars) threaten the world with an even more dangerous escalation of the arms race to outer space, and the development of new weapons of mass destruction.

The nuclear arms race imposes enormous economic burdens on the peoples of the world, both in the advance and the underdeveloped countries. Ending it would free great resources for constructive purposes and the raising of living standards.

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CSO: 5200/1353

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

ICELANDIC PREMIER VISITS MOSCOW, DISCUSSES REYKJAVIK, INF

Meets With Gorbachev

PM041211 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Mar 86 First Edition pp 1-2

[TASS report: "Meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and Steingrímur Hermannsson"]

[Text] On 2 March, in the Kremlin, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev met Steingrímur Hermannsson, prime minister of the Republic of Iceland. It is symbolic, Comrade Gorbachev said in greeting the guest, that your visit coincides with an important step in the spirit of Reykjavik, our proposal concerning nuclear missiles in Europe. Reykjavik is alive. It has shown everyone that an opportunity exists to reach accords on problems of the most major significance with which mankind's survival is linked. It was a major breakthrough and we did everything to retain the height attained there. Reykjavik has come to occupy a firm place in international life and we will not permit ourselves to be dragged backward in Geneva.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev again thanked the government and people of Iceland for responding to the request to stage the Soviet-American meeting in their capital and for doing all they could for its success.

The interlocutors agreed that following Reykjavik, only further progress is possible and, in Hermannsson's words, only such work is possible as will make it continue to play its part both in Soviet-American relations and in East-West relations; in relations between the North and the South, in general, in relations between people.

The fact that our mind is indeed made up to search for solutions in the Reykjavik spirit, Comrade Gorbachev emphasized, also is evident in our proposal on European missiles. Thus, we again invite the U.S. Administration to continue the search on the basis of Reykjavik.

The Moscow forum For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity, has played a major part in this decision of ours. We experienced at close quarters the mood of the international public, its concern and alarm, caused by the reaction of certain circles to Reykjavik, by the fact that it has not been found possible to put a halt to nuclear testing, by the SALT II treaty having been undermined, and by the fact that the ABM Treaty was threatened.

We thought it all over very seriously and decided to make yet another step that could lead to serious progress. If an agreement on medium-range missiles can be achieved -- and I am confident that it is possible -- it will have major political significance,

since, up until now, we only have been arming ourselves, while in this case we would commence the process of disarming ourselves.

It would create an atmosphere of greater trust. It is of substance in purely military terms, too, since a considerable proportion of an entire type of nuclear arms would be eliminated and an entire continent would be rid of them.

We also would like the medium-range missiles agreement to provide an impetus to the talks on reducing strategic arms, in conjunction with refraining from abandoning the ABM Treaty, and to promote the commencement of the talks on conventional arms and armed forces, to speed up the progress in the case of eliminating chemical weapons.

Psychologically, it would improve the prospects for resolving regional conflicts. We do not put off the search for joint solutions to other problems, international, political, and global. However, the first real step in the field of disarmament is of importance. The world is brimming over with problems and what is needed is an active policy on the part of both sides. I am confident that requirements which have objectively, become pressing, will, in any event, make their way through to politics. This will facilitate an influx into politics of people capable of solving problems. There will be more and more of those who have a serious understanding of the need for a new way of thinking. The understanding of long-term human interests will, more and more, gain the upper hand in world politics, and there will be less and less opportunism, preelection considerations, and the subordination of the greatest problems to the vicissitudes of competition between parties.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev stressed the role of small and medium-size countries in the general process of normalizing the international situation. This applies, among other things, to the idea of a nonnuclear zone in northern Europe, whose formation would be an important factor in reducing general tension.

At the request of his collocutor, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev dwelled on the issues of restructuring in Soviet society. Our idea is simple: to use the economic, political, intellectual and all other kinds of potentials inherent in socialism in order to put dynamism into the society, which is mature enough to receive it and which needs it. We are digging deep, and the process is far from smooth, but it is essential. The alternative is stagnation, which our people does not want and cannot tolerate. The idea of restructuring has not been taken on trust by society, but is based on a serious discussion in the framework of that very openness or glasnost, as you would say in Russian.

Our society is being transformed in that melting pot of impetuous public opinion and active creativeness; a new quality will emerge in a number of years. But that quality will be a superior stage of socialism and nothing else.

We do not have answers to all questions. We accumulate experience, extract lessons from what has been done already, but the chief road has been chosen, and it has been taken up by the party and the people.

Some humanitarian issues and prospects for widening contacts among citizens of various countries with respect to the values prized by each of them, opportunities for regular and competent international talks on topical problems of the modern times, also were discussed.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev asked the prime minister to convey good wishes to the Icelandic people, who are liked all the more in the Soviet Union with regard to the Reykjavik summit. He expressed his satisfaction with the mutual understanding that emerged again in the course of the conversation, just like in Reykjavik.

Hermannsson spoke of the great interest displayed in the West and in Iceland to everything now taking place in the USSR. He wished success to the Soviet leadership. It inspires hope in all of us, he said, for the world has become too pessimistic and grim. It needs to be stimulated by optimism, and you in the USSR are creating such a stimulus, both through the transformations in your country and through staking your success on dialogue, which is needed by the world in order to depart from the difficult situation to the road of cooperation.

Attending the conversation was Ambassador T.A. Tomasson.

Exchanges Views With Ryzhkov

PM041221 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Mar 87 First Edition pp 1, 4

[TASS report: "Soviet-Icelandic Talks"]

[Excerpts] Talks were held in the Kremlin 2 March between Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and S. Hermannsson, prime minister of Iceland.

Urgent international problems and matters pertaining to Soviet-Icelandic relations were discussed in a constructive spirit and an atmosphere of frankness.

Special attention at the talks was devoted to the new Soviet proposals set forth in the statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on singling out the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe from the package of nuclear disarmament issues and on an early conclusion of a new agreement on that type of weapons.

Those proposals demonstrate the Soviet Union's goodwill and its constructive approach and readiness to seek a solution with the aim of achieving mutually acceptable agreements on nuclear disarmament problems.

Nikolay Ryzhkov dwelt on principled key issues of the program proposed by the Soviet Union for establishing a comprehensive system of international security, stressing that the set of measures envisioned by it and aiming for the complete elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction before the end of the current century opened a realistic road toward resolving international problems of paramount importance and with a view to warding off the threat of a nuclear holocaust from humankind.

That had been confirmed during the meeting between the leaders of the USSR and the U.S. in the capital of Iceland last October -- the meeting that charted the prospect of a nuclear-free world.

The Icelandic side pointed out the importance of the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik and expressed hope for a continuation of the Soviet Union's and the United States' efforts accords on key disarmament issues.

Steingrímur Hermannsson gave a positive appraisal of the Soviet Union's new initiative on concluding a separate agreement on the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe.

The two sides expressed a firm intention to contribute to strengthening international security and stability, and to seek to curb the arms race. The high responsibility of political figures for the destiny of their countries, of Europe and the world, and the need for joint actions of countries in the name of averting the nuclear threat were spoken of in this regard.

Taking part in the talks for the Soviet side were: B.I. Aristov, USSR foreign trade minister; K.F. Katushev, chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations; A.G. Kovalev, USSR first deputy foreign minister; and I.N. Krasavin, USSR ambassador to Iceland; and for the Icelandic side: T.A. Tomasson, Icelandic ambassador to the USSR; (G. Benediktsson), head of the prime minister's office; (G. Flovens), director of the Herring Committee; and other officials.

Ryzhkov Dinner Speech

PM041613 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Mar 87 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "N.I. Ryzhkov's Speech"]

[Excerpt] We are pleased to welcome you in the Kremlin today, minister prime minister, your wife and other Icelandic guests, said N.I. Ryzhkov. This visit is being seen in our country, not according to strict protocol but in purely human manner, as a return, in a familiar sense, for the visit to Iceland, in October last year, of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. As we receive the representatives of the Icelandic Republic in the Soviet Union, we are with the very best sentiments, repaying a debt of hospitality to its leaders and to the citizens of Reykjavik.

This city also has now entered history in a new capacity -- as the place where the prospect of a nonnuclear world was half-opened before mankind. The way to Reykjavik was long and hard. While it has not yet been possible to set about dealing practically with the main task -- moving toward genuine disarmament -- the efforts of many states, peoples, parties, organizations and movements to achieve this aim should, nonetheless, not be regarded as in vain.

At the meeting in the Icelandic capital, the Soviet side introduced unique proposals which embraced the major aspects of disarmament. To a large extent, the considerations of the United States and its allies were taken into account. At the foundation of these, as of many other of the Soviet Union's initiatives, is the new political thinking, our program for setting up a comprehensive system of international security put forward by the 27th CPSU Congress.

On the eve of your visit, the Soviet Union took the decision to make yet another major step down the road toward mutually acceptable accords in the area of nuclear disarmament. In displaying goodwill and a desire to find ways of improving interstate relations in Europe and a real strengthening of its security, we proposed singling out the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe from out of the group of questions, and urgently concluding a separate agreement [soglasheniye] on it.

Taking into account the considerations of NATO's European members, a positive answer also has been given, too, to other questions associated with this: This is the removal from the GDR and the CSSR, by agreement with the governments of those countries, of enhanced-range operational-tactical missiles [operativno-takticheskikh raket povyshennoy dal'nosti], which were sited [razmeshcheny] there as countermeasures to the deployment [razvertyvaniye] of Pershing-2's and cruise missiles in Western Europe. We are also ready to make an immediate start on talks aimed at cutting back and completely eliminating other operational-tactical missiles [drugikh raket operativno-takticheskogo naznacheniya]. In addition to this number, Soviet medium-range missiles in Asia are being cut to 100 warheads, and the same number of warheads on medium-range missiles could be left by the United States on its national territory.

We reckon that Europe is seriously considering the evolving situation, for here is a unique opportunity to act so that our continent ceases to be viewed as a potential theater for nuclear war. This depends not only on the Soviet Union and the United States, but on all European states. We must all act so that concern for the national security of each does not come into conflict with the security interests of all other European countries, so that the one can be combined organically with the other. It is from this premise that our proposal proceeds, and without it there can be no success in applying this historic opportunity.

We would like to hope that Iceland, whose opinion we respect, will evaluate the new Soviet initiative in the appropriate manner.

Hermannsson Dinner Address

PM060951 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Mar 87 First Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading "In a Friendly Atmosphere" on Icelandic Prime Minister S. Hermannsson's speech at 2 March dinner hosted by USSR Council of Ministers Chairman N.I. Ryzhkov]

[Excerpts] We Icelanders believe that the peoples must live in peace. We condemn all violence and believe that all peoples must determine their own fate. A state's army has no business outside that state's boundaries.

In this regard, I would like to express particular satisfaction at our talks today. Mr Chairman. As befits engineers, we conducted those talks openly and sincerely. These talks were undoubtedly beneficial to relations between our peoples.

Unfortunately, the situation in the world has developed in a different spirit since the last world war. The considerable achievements of scientific and technical progress, which could have created good living conditions for the peoples of the world, have been used for military purposes. The nuclear arms race has reached such proportions that the world is now on the edge of the abyss. The peoples are living in fear of nuclear power [energiya], which can destroy life on earth many times over. Things cannot continue that way for long. The great powers must abandon the path that they have been following recently. Nuclear armaments must be substantially reduced and subsequently eliminated. We Icelanders will promote this, although it is obvious that the ability to achieve such a result rests primarily with the great powers.

In this regard, we received with satisfaction the proposal of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee on holding a meeting between the leaders of the great powers in Iceland last fall.

It was clear to me that this event was of such importance that it could resolve mankind's future. On behalf of the Icelandic Government, I immediately agreed to the holding of that meeting in Reykjavik.

I will not deny that at the end of the meeting I was disappointed. That could be said for many others, too. However, it is now clear to most people that the Reykjavik meeting did more than had initially seemed to be the case. The proposals put forward there formed a basis for the continuation of talks on the reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear arms. The Reykjavik meeting was an epoch-making event. It gave people fresh hope.

I agree that it is necessary to work for the destruction of nuclear armaments. It is clear that this will take some time and will take place in stages. However, it is necessary to set such a task at the very beginning or else it will not be achieved.

In this context, I should like to express satisfaction at the remarkable proposals on the reduction and elimination of nuclear arms set out by Soviet state leader M.S. Gorbachev in Reykjavik, proposals which have subsequently been confirmed.

In particular, the unconditional elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe was recently proposed. In my view, these proposals can serve as the basis for an agreement that would lead to the complete elimination of nuclear armaments by, for instance, the end of the century.

We in Iceland are proud of our contribution to the process of changing the way people think, which seems to have happened since the Reykjavik meeting. We would like to consolidate this atmosphere and mankind's hopes which it engendered. It would be good if the great powers were to support the idea of creating in Iceland an organization whose purpose would be to help improve mutual relations not only between East and West but also among all the peoples of the world. This would be an organization with the aim of preserving life on earth. We could provide the conditions for conferences and meetings, contacts between people, thought and research, and everything that would be considered necessary for that purpose.

3 Mar News Conference

LD031301 Moscow TASS in English 1241 GMT 3 Mar 87

[Excerpt] Moscow March 3 TASS--The latest Soviet proposals for the elimination of short- and medium-range missiles from Europe were discussed at the Icelandic-Soviet talks in Moscow. Icelandic Prime Minister Steingrímur Hermannsson told a press conference here today.

"We also discussed many aspects of such a first step to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. We also discussed the very interesting things that are taking place in the Soviet Union, which aroused very great interest all over the world and also in my country."

Answering questions from correspondents, the prime minister said that a nuclear weapon-free zone was very much discussed and that Icelandic Parliament passed a resolution in May 1984.

"It states, in short, that nuclear weapons shall not be allowed on Icelandic soil, and this has always been our policy, and that such a nuclear-free zone should stretch from the Urals to Greenland."

"It actually seems to me," the prime minister continued, "that the new proposal for eliminating all short- and medium-range missiles from the whole of Europe goes even further and is of even greater importance."

People are now after Reykjavik and after the Soviet proposal of 15th January 1986 for the first time talking seriously of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet proposal is very positive and without any conditions, (such as linkage) with SDI, [punctuation as received] and this would be a very important first step towards the total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons."

Answering a question from a Danish correspondent about the U.S. military base in Keflavik, Hermannsson explained that the base had been established "only for keeping track of what was going on in and over the north Atlantic," and added that the Icelanders "would be the first ones to be very pleased if no foreign bases were necessary in any country of the world."

"I'm very firmly of the opinion that the only reliable basis is greater confidence between people," the prime minister said. "Other things necessary at the present time are to keep the balance... It will have to be carefully considered and this of course includes conventional weapons. While we have not reached the ultimate stage of confidence we have to rely on the balance in conventional weapons."

Copenhagen News Conference

LD051045 Moscow TASS in English 0918 GMT 5 Mar 87

[Text] Copenhagen March 5 TASS — The conversation with Mikhail Gorbachev has convinced me of the absolute seriousness of the Soviet leader's proposal that medium-range missiles be withdrawn from Europe.

This was stated by Prime Minister of Iceland Steingrimur Hermannsson at a press conference in the Danish capital. He arrived there upon completion of his official visit to the USSR.

The head of the Icelandic Government underlined the Soviet Union's readiness to get down right away to negotiations on tactical missiles. He said that the question of establishing a nuclear-free zone in the north of Europe had also been discussed with Mikhail Gorbachev.

The Soviet leader, he said, expressed understanding of Iceland's opinion that such a zone should embrace a territory from the Urals to Greenland. The general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee stressed it was very important that the idea of a nuclear-free zone in the north of the European continent be backed by as many countries of the region as possible.

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CSO: 5200/1353

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG PAPERS COMMENT ON OPENING OF SEVENTH ROUND OF NST

Both Sides Want Agreement

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 16 Jan 87 p 9

[Article by Christoph Bertram: "No One Wants to Be the First: The Gap Widens Between Washington and Moscow"]

[Text] Negotiations are once again underway in Geneva. Since January 15, Americans and Soviets have been holding a new round of talks on missiles, alternately in the Soviet mission in the Avenue de la Paix, surrounded by high steel fencing, and the American Embassy on the Route de Premigny, also surrounded by high steel fencing. After Reykjavik, both sides are emphasizing that the door is open to an agreement. Up to now, however, they have been acting like two overly courteous gentlemen who are blocking the way to arms control with the polite invitation "after you."

Certainly, it is obvious that both Americans and Soviets are interested in reaching an agreement, but each on their own terms. The American president, feeling pressure as a result of the Iran/Contra scandal, could well use a foreign policy success, particularly at the present time. For weeks he has been looking for events which could push new revelations concerning shady dealings in the basement of the White House out of the headlines. According to what the president said in his New Year address to Soviet citizens, both sides have come closer together than ever before.

The fact that Mikhail Gorbachev is also impatient is quite clear as well. As he announced at the end of the year, in 1987 he intends to work with all his energy towards reaching an agreement with the United States. The colorless expert Victor Karpov was replaced at the head of the Soviet delegation by Julij Voronzov, an America specialist and a close confidant of Dobrynin, the Central Committee secretary responsible for foreign relations. And in Moscow there are official assurances that the Kremlin wishes to reach agreement in its negotiations with America during Reagan's tenure in office, which means before the beginning of 1989. "We do not wish to waste the two years prior to the next presidential election in the United States."

Under Time Pressure

But how should this time be used? The extent to which this question concerns the man of action in the Kremlin is shown by the persistence with which he constantly asked visitors from the West over past months whether a compromise was still possible with Ronald Reagan before the presidential campaign at the beginning of 1988 co-opts America's political energies: "You know the Americans. What do you think?" The answer that the general secretary has received from everyone up to now is not surprising. An agreement is possible in the near future only with Ronald Reagan, only he can carry the conservatives in the Senate--where a two-thirds majority is necessary to ratify the treaty.

Henry Kissinger recently outlined the time constraints for a possible agreement: "To wait out the next two years basically means losing four to six years..., for a new president first must familiarize himself with the responsibilities of office. He has to put together a new government. He has to develop a new basis for a relationship with Congress. Even for purely practical reasons, serious negotiations would hardly be possible before the end of a new president's first year in office. Thereafter some time would still be required before a final agreement could be reached."

The argument is convincing. But time pressure does not always lead to a readiness to enter into compromise. On the contrary, today it seems even more probable than prior to the Iran furor that Reagan, come what may, intends to hold fast to his SDI project and that he is also held to it by his right-wing supporters. Secretary of Defense Weinberger has just announced that the first stage of a space defense system could be operational by the beginning of the next decade. As a close colleague of the president explains, Reagan "will never give up SDI, it belongs once and for all to his political legacy--along with the Reagan doctrine, tax reform and limiting the powers of government." It appears well-nigh unthinkable that the old president--shortly before his 76th birthday--would wish at this point to give up his convictions. The president wants an agreement, but not at the cost of his pet project.

And furthermore, it is very likely that Reagan could not do this even if he wanted to. Robert Ellsworth--himself a Republican, former assistant secretary of defense and today one of the most independent observers of the Washington scene--predicts what would happen if Reagan, contrary to all expectations, wanted to turn conciliatory with regard to SDI: "All hell would break loose in the right wing of the Republican Party--and Reagan would be forced to back down."

Spurgeon Keeny, who served under different presidents for many years in the field of disarmament and who now heads the Independent Arms Control Association, actually considers the president incapable of controlling his own administration to the point that--even with the best intentions in the White House--a signable treaty could emerge in the time that is still available. "Even in the case of Salt II under Carter we needed a year to clarify all of the details, even though every one was cooperating--the State Department, the Pentagon, the CIA." Today, however, there is no kind of leadership from the White House. The individual departments cheerfully continue their internecine

warfare. Reagan's government is structurally incapable of reaching arms control with the Soviet Union--particularly with the situation as it is at the present time.

If the Western superpower is simply marking time, can at least its Eastern counterpart take the first step through the door? Mikhail Gorbachev's desire to do just this can almost be read in his face. Since Reykjavik, when the Kremlin chief doggedly insisted that all SDI testing outside of the laboratory had to be prohibited, official and semi-official Soviet emissaries have let it be understood in all quarters that this issue is still open to discussion. What is really important is that no testing be permitted in outer space. The decisive question, however, is whether the Soviet party chief has the determination and the political clout to loosen the strings that are tying up the Soviet package of all or nothing--no progress without a strict regulating of SDI.

Clouds of Uncertainty

It would seem that some justification exists for this. On the one hand, the tightly tied-up package deal undermines the credibility of the Soviet desire for disarmament. Anyone who, like Gorbachev, wishes to impress the world with great visions of disarmament, can ill afford a posture of constant carping. On the other hand, the new precondition also contradicts earlier Soviet positions: prior to Reykjavik, Moscow was still prepared to reach a separate agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles. Furthermore, the moderate Soviet reaction to the most recent American sally beyond the limits of the Salt II agreement confirms that civilian and military Soviet leaders alike regard the present strategic balance with the cool unconcern of those who have armed themselves in time.

And finally: SDI has lost much of its earlier menacing aspects for the Soviets. Today, not only Andre Sakharov, but other less independent Soviet experts are convinced that "a strong opponent will always find ways and means to overcome any kind of defense system in space--and with significantly lower expenditures." Furthermore, in Washington as well, clouds of uncertainty are settling lower and lower over the future of SDI. Congress has repeatedly made multiple cuts in the budget of the ambitious program and will now be even less prepared to gratify the wishes of the Pentagon, since the budget deficit is even more critical, the Democrats enjoy a majority in the Senate as well, and Reagan's aura is gradually ebbing away.

There might be one last and perhaps decisive reason for Moscow to put less stress on SDI: the efforts in Congress to obligate Reagan's government in its SDI program to observe the narrow limits set by the Soviet-American treaty on missile defense (ABM treaty). For more than a year, Reagan and his SDI supporters have been trying to free themselves of the obligations imposed by this treaty. Their position in Reykjavik can only be understood in this light: the president was interested--as he constantly stressed--in the unrestricted possibility of "researching, testing and developing" space defense against missiles for a period of ten years, although the testing and development of defense systems in space is prohibited under the terms of the ABM treaty. Reagan wanted to obtain a dispensation from these terms in

Reykjavik. However, the Soviets wanted to hear nothing of such a proposal, and instead insisted on even more rigorous proscriptions.

Congress could now build a bridge across the gap that became so evident in Reykjavik. Since the White House in its efforts to throw off the fetters of the ABM treaty invoked the--secret--history of the negotiations, several senators demanded and were given the right to examine the documents themselves. Their report is expected at any moment. The general thrust of the report was communicated by one of these senators, Democrat Carl Levin, in a stinging letter sent on December 1, 1986, to Secretary of State Shultz. The legal opinions drawn up by top legal experts in the State Department are said to be incomplete and biased, the method of investigation "defective at all levels." Today observers in Washington do not doubt that Congress--to the extent of its powers--will hold the administration to the old interpretation of the ABM treaty, probably by rejecting funds for SDI testing which go beyond the limits that are allowed.

Signal to the Kremlin

This would certainly not be a water-tight guarantee, but nonetheless it would convey an important signal to the Kremlin: if you exercise restraint, then we will crop the wings of the hawks around Reagan. To be sure, it is uncertain whether this would suffice to bring Moscow to a new spirit of accommodation. Gorbachov would first have to win over his colleagues in the Soviet leadership for such a step. Even in Reykjavik he had to admit that his mandate for negotiating was limited: the package had been tied up not by him alone, but by the collective. And not only in the West, in Moscow, too, there are those who observe the failure of Reykjavik with visible satisfaction. Those who want to have nothing at all to do with Reagan's government will certainly insist that the knots remain tied and the strings tight on Moscow's package.

Thus at the present time there are few indications that one of the two superpowers which are so zealously deferring to each other in Geneva will take the decisive step through the door. The great problems of arms control will certainly be sounded out, perhaps options for a later resolution may even be discussed. A breakthrough remains unlikely.

For the future, however, it will be less a question of how Washington and Moscow negotiate with each other than of the way in which they behave towards each other. Can Congress rein back the Pentagon? And will the Kremlin honor such a move by constraining itself? Here is where the best hopes for disarmament lie at the present time.

This will first be put to the test on February 5. This is the date on which Reagan's government intends to carry out its next nuclear testing in the Nevada desert. Even last fall, Congress protested this, even though without the force of law. This time it could try to stay the president's hand more effectively. The Soviet Union has made the duration of its own moratorium on testing dependent on America's acting accordingly--a model such as is practiced the other way around in the case of anti-satellite weapons.

Arms control through mutual restraint? This lags far behind the visions of Reykjavik. But it would not be the worst solution for the interim, until Washington has once again become capable of action.

Voronzov's Appointment Called Positive

Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 14 Jan 87 p 1

[Editorial by J.B.: "Voronzov instead of Karpov"]

[Text] The change at the head of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva negotiations, the replacement of head Soviet negotiator Karpov by the former deputy foreign minister Voronzov, indicates that for the Soviets as well, the course and results of the summit meeting in Reykjavik did not correspond to expectations. Whether or not they blame Karpov for this--even in Reykjavik he had to stand back in the expert negotiations behind head of the Soviet general staff Achromyev--is not as important as the fact that they are now offering a negotiator who is no longer tied to the words and tactics of his predecessor. In this sense, the United States regards the appointment of Voronzov as a positive sign. Washington has reacted adroitly to the change. Washington has not given in to the Soviet request that a new and supposedly more powerful negotiator be installed on the American side as well; rather, President Reagan has given the head of the American delegation a higher ranking in the hierarchy of the State Department and retained him in his function. For the moment, it is the United States which is demonstrating that there is continuity in their policy.

Max Kampelman, the chief American negotiator who has thus been strengthened, has, by the way, announced that both sides basically continue to consider it possible that all strategic offensive weapons can be reduced by 50 percent within a period of five years and that medium-range forces will be eliminated from the arsenals of both powers, with the exception of 100 systems stationed in Siberia and in Alaska, respectively. The problem is, he says, to transform this into an acceptable and verifiable agreement. And then of course the main question is whether the continued validity of the ABM treaty--the agreement concerning defense systems against ballistic nuclear weapons--can be so interpreted that it does not collide with the research and testing of the American SDI program.

The official Soviet position remains, as was announced yesterday in Moscow, that disarmament and the restrictions that the Soviets want with regard to the American SDI program continue to form a package. The only interesting question is therefore what freedom of interpretation the Soviets offer to the Americans with the naming of Voronzov.

Five Issues Seen Dominant

Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 6 Jan 87 p 3

[Article by Hermann Bohle: "Rapprochement between East and West: The Disarmament Dialogue with Moscow Resembles a Game with Five Balls"]

[Text] The representatives of both super powers meet on January 15 in Geneva for the seventh round of negotiations on nuclear and space arms control. The Christmas recess and an "Intermediate round" held in early December at the Lake of Geneva provided time to rethink their positions following the summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev in Reykjavik. The young Soviet journalist on the ARD news commentary program last Sunday was right: East and West have never been so close.

Between the democratic and the communist-dominated worlds, the statesmen and their experts must juggle five balls in the disarmament or arms control arena--five topics, all of which are interrelated. Opinions differ with regard to conventional arms. For example, the East has accumulated superior arsenals with regard to artillery and tanks, combat aircraft and air defense missiles. It has an advantage of 6-1 over NATO.

This advantage can be eliminated only if the Warsaw Pact nations would unilaterally scrap such armaments. Only after that could a parallel reduction on both sides to the lowest level be considered. For this reason, NATO focussed discussion on this topic in the middle of November. As you may recall, the Warsaw Pact in June of last year followed up a series of nuclear disarmament plans only by a--vague--conventional offer.

Equal Footing Necessary

Here the direction was not correct. Only when the conventional "ball" is played correctly is a comprehensive nuclear disarmament possible. As long as Eastern conventional superiority does not yield to a status of equality, NATO cannot completely renounce "ball" two--nuclear weapons which serve to deter the use of conventional superiority. This makes the work of the jugglers with the third "ball" more difficult: a ban on all nuclear testing is only possible with the destruction of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, the West needs nuclear weapons so that Moscow will never be tempted to misuse its absolute superiority in chemical weapons. For this reason, NATO places great priority on "ball" four--the world-wide ban on all chemical weapons, which has been the subject of promising negotiations at the Geneva UN disarmament conference. Finally, above everything hovers the research of the missile defense systems of the U.S. and the USSR (SDI). This fifth "ball" no longer appears to be made of lead: Soviet remarks and an anticipated forced curtailment of funding by the new U.S. Congress could allow room for an agreement to be reached.

The interrelationships are clearly recognized in West and East. They are even useful: the conventional NATO disadvantage can only be eliminated if compensations are offered to the East in other areas for asymmetrical disarmament. Why should Gorbachev otherwise scrap his tanks "for nothing"? Only, this unfortunately also means nothing can happen quickly.

Rapid action would be possible in three areas: 1. In the elimination of all nuclear medium-range missiles with a greater range in Europe. Reagan and Gorbachev reached basic agreement on this point in Reykjavik. Each of the two superpowers is to be permitted only 100 such systems outside of the Old World.

NATO supports a European zero-option, but links this to the demand for an inclusion in the treaty of the elimination of the new short-range missiles in the East, based in the GDR and elsewhere--superiority: 9-1.

2. The Geneva UN negotiations concerning the elimination of chemical weapons could be brought quickly to a conclusion. For this to happen, the East would merely need to replace what has been up until now only verbal proclamations concerning the acceptance of foolproof on-sight inspection in a conclusive form. Many portions of the UN treaty have already been formulated in writing.

3. Chancellor Kohl's proposal for a gradual reduction in the number and detonation strength of nuclear testing was taken up in Reykjavik. As long as nuclear weapons are needed, testing is necessary: to check the correct functioning of existing weapons, to try out new means of protection--and to continue to develop security measures against "wars by mistake." Although the U.S. needs nuclear testing for SDI, it could go along with test limitations.

Rapprochement of Strategies

For more to happen, more time is needed. Of decisive importance is the rapprochement in terms of strategy between East and West. In the 1960's, Soviet Marshall Sokolovsky justified the rapid recourse to nuclear weapons in the event of a conflict as an element of Soviet strategy, officially and in writing. Chief of the general staff Achromejev, who was appointed by Gorbachev in 1984, regards the nuclear deadlock as a reason for presumably purely conventional warfare in the event of a conflict. As does NATO, he wants to strike at remote targets deep in the hostile heartland with precision weapons. This general agreement in the lines of thought should, in the final analysis, make it easier to eliminate conventional arms, should Moscow also intend to establish an equilibrium.

However, one critical difference remains: like his predecessor in the office of chief of the general staff (to 1984) Ogarkov, Achromejev also supports an offensive strategy--although American experts ascribe to him a more positive attitude with regard to detente. It was noted by NATO as well as on the Geneva disarmament scene that Achromejev was among the leaders on the Soviet side in the negotiations carried out by the two teams in Reykjavik.

Parallel to the summit talks, the top advisers to Reagan and Gorbachev had outlined the details there and summarized them in drafted memoranda. It was thought on the side of the West that the Soviet chief of the general staff for the moment accepted Gorbachev's course--but without identifying himself to the extent that in the case of a debacle concerning reforms of the "nomenclature" he would disappear in Orcus along with Gorbachev.

The SDI question, which overshadows all else, could be closer to a solution since Soviet foreign minister Schevardnadse announced on November 10, in a statement which went largely unnoticed, that it is "natural and legitimate" for SDI research in the laboratory to include the construction of "finished models and prototypes"--within the next ten years. Thereafter, both sides would have to discuss the results. From the Moscow side, it is also heard

that a laboratory does not "necessarily have to have four walls." Moscow could approve of anything except for experiments in space for America as for its own SDI research, with a time limit. As a result, disarmament treaties in the other four areas would no longer be dependent on an American renunciation of SDI.

SDI Still Called Obstruction

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 20 Jan 87 p 3

[Editorial by Pierre Simonitsch: "SDI Stumbling Block"]

[Text] The staging shows talent: first the raising in rank of the major players, then the theatrical greeting in the blowing snow, a dinner for two, finally the veil of secrecy over the proceedings. American chief delegate Max Kampelman described his first meeting with his new opposite, Julij Voronsov, as "constructive and encouraging." By naming a first deputy foreign minister as its negotiator in Geneva, the Soviet Union wished to stress the importance with which it views arms control. A touch of drama was added by commentaries in the press with such titles as "Last Chance" and "Decisive Round."

Now that the spotlights on the opening of the seventh round of the American-Soviet disarmament negotiations are turned off, the actors are returning to the hard ground of reality. This week the experts are bending over their dossiers behind closed doors. They do not have new proposals in their attache cases. Even as they are searching for compromises, the arms race threatens to outdistance them.

Both sides are modernizing their nuclear weapons and conventional forces. The U.S. defense budget proposed by President Reagan for the coming fiscal year provides for an increase in real terms of 3 percent. Earlier arms control agreements such as Salt II are disregarded, although no new agreements are in sight. The U.S. defense department would like to see as many facts accomplished as possible before the mandate of the current government expires in two years.

But there are also those forces in motion which wish to put an end to the wastefulness that is endangering the commonweal. The question which was discussed at the beginning of the 1970's of how much armament is sufficient is once again a hot item. Between the currents maneuvers an uncertain president who abhors having to study the documentary files. The result is an erratic, contradictory American security policy.

The actions of the Soviet Union in this regard are wily but predictable. They are directed at a reduction in arms costs. In order to crank up the stagnant economy, Gorbachev must trim the military apparatus, which according to Western estimates consumes 15 percent of national income. For this the Party needs the help of the U.S. in the form of disarmament treaties which establish at least an apparent equilibrium at a lower level. A one-sided restructuring of investments in favor of the civilian sector would probably result in strong resistance on the part of the Soviet military complex, which provides millions of citizens with privileges and top salaries.

The possibility that they could be put into second place by the U.S. in armaments and could lose the insignia of an evenly matched superpower is a nightmare to the Soviets. Such a blow to the revolution and to the Russian sense of mission would set off old anti-Western feelings. Gorbachov's reforms would be endangered. For this reason, the Kremlin leadership is seeking at any cost to thwart the American SDI project. It cannot deviate from this position, regardless of how it actually assesses the viability of a missile defense system in space, because SDI has become the symbol of the American desire for military superiority.

On the other hand, Reagan has become so doggedly preoccupied with those plans which he was talked into by dubious advisers that he is scarcely able to enter into any compromise. It is not only the dream of the invincible fortress America that keeps SDI alive. Influential people who believe that the country needs a new, grandiose project after the pioneering achievements of the railway, nuclear power plants and space travel. Although in the almost four years which have passed since the "Star Wars" speech of the president none of the enormous technological problems has been solved, adherence to an unrestricted SDI program is poisoning the political atmosphere more than ever before.

It is no help here when highly placed diplomats in Geneva shake each other's hands before the cameras. More than an intermediate agreement concerning medium-range nuclear missiles is not to be expected from the negotiations for the foreseeable future. But it will only be possible to speak of a true breakthrough when the strategic nuclear weapons with over 10,000 warheads have been drastically reduced on each side. To reduce these arsenals by half is a common goal. There seems to be no lack of personal determination on the part of either Gorbachev or Reagan, as the summit meeting in Reykjavik demonstrated. But the stumbling block is still in the way: the entrenched debate surrounding SDI is destroying the basis of negotiations which was reached two years ago, to understand offensive and defensive weapons systems in their interaction with each other.

Soviets Must Show Flexibility

Bonn DIE WELT in German 15 Jan 87 p 2

[Article by Bernt Conrad: "General Winter in Geneva"]

[Text] Moscow rang in the seventh round of the Geneva disarmament negotiations which begin today with an effective public relations move. The higher-ranking Soviet diplomat Voronzov replaces his predecessor Karpov at the conference table across from Kampelman, the head of the American delegation, in order to give the discussion--according to the official Kremlin version--"impulses" and "increased dynamism."

If Voronzov should actually turn out to be more so than was his predecessor in a position to make proposals and decisions on the spot, as Soviet ambassador in Bonn and former negotiator Kwizinski assures us is the case, this could have at least a time-saving effect. For this reason, Washington welcomed the change in personnel, however without for its part following up on the Soviet

suggestion that the seasoned Kampelman be recalled. President Reagan did just the opposite: by naming his head negotiator also as a legal adviser, he underscored his satisfaction with the way in which negotiations have been carried out.

Of course, the success of the negotiations in Geneva does not depend primarily on the persons involved. If there are prospects at all for agreements concerning arms control and arms reductions, then it is only because objective conditions are forcing the Soviet Union to move in this direction. An unsuccessful system of economic control and distribution, incompetent bureaucrats and obsolete technology, poor working morale and discipline and an unprecedented and excessive military build-up have brought the Soviet economy to the brink of ruin. For this reason, the consequences of the hard winter there are especially devastating.

Mikhail Gorbachev wants to change all this. But up to now, despite much talk, he is still standing there with empty hands. Given this situation, disarmament results in Geneva would be a two-fold blessing for him. First, because the money for a renewal of Soviet industry simply cannot be created without reducing arms expenditures. Second, because success in foreign and disarmament policy would bring the general secretary much desired relief in his confrontations with critics within his own party.

Because his interests lie in this direction, this has recently led to Gorbachev's publicly announced intention of continuing to strive to reach an agreement with the Reagan administration, which has two more years in office, despite the negative outcome of the summit talks in Reykjavik, instead of waiting for a future U.S. government, which would represent an unknown factor. This has caused cautious optimism on the part of even such a hard-core skeptic as Richard Perle of the Pentagon and such an experienced expert as outgoing ambassador in Moscow, Arthur Hartman.

"Cautious" because--particularly because they are looking for results--the Soviets in Geneva will now negotiate especially tenaciously and by no means dispense with propagandistic accompaniment. Their goal continues to be to kill two birds with one stone, i.e. to reach a reduction in nuclear arms and at the same time to "cripple" SDI, as Reagan said in Reykjavik. At the same time, it is hoped that a well-measured dose of influence on the European NATO partners might lead to internal Western pressure on Washington and weaken Kampelman's negotiating position.

This calculation, which is based on opportunism and timidity in Western Europe and to which the German social democracy unfortunately long ago fell victim, was rejected several days ago in a happily very clear way by Dutch foreign minister van den Broek; the Soviets should know that the attempt to disrupt the Western alliance with regard to the SDI question is in vain, he emphasized as representative of one of the NATO states which are regarded by Moscow ordinarily as particularly "susceptible" to propaganda.

Actually, Gorbachev should not allow himself to fall victim to an illusion; if he really wants to achieve results in Geneva, he will have to dispense with making any arrangement in individual areas dependent on unanimity concerning

strategic defense systems (meaning an American renunciation of SDI), such as was done in Reykjavik. Whatever may result in the final analysis from SDI research and at what point in time the development could be transformed into real weaponry technology--there is nothing that argues, independent of negotiations concerning this area, against agreeing on and implementing a reduction in medium- and long-range missiles, as was attempted in Reykjavik.

If such were the case, even skeptical allies could view a European zero-option in medium-range missiles (INF), which both Reagan and Gorbachev were prepared to accept in Reykjavik, with more composure. For the Americans have in the meantime come to recognize the related dangers of Soviet superiority in short-range missiles, which would pose a much greater threat to a Europe that had been stripped of medium-range weapons than is today the case.

For this reason, they want to stipulate in an INF agreement not only follow-up negotiations on short-range missiles, but also to establish an upper limit for such weapons and to assure themselves of the right to reach this upper limit on the Western side (where at the moment there are no short-range missiles at all). The Soviets are still opposing this move. But without the right to parity, any kind of effort to reduce the numbers of weapons would be meaningless.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: KARPOV CALLS U.S. ZERO OPTION 'BLUFF'

PM221800 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with V.P. Karpov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Administration for Problems of Arms Limitation and Disarmament, by A. Shalnev: "V. Karpov: Isn't Their 'Zero Option' a Bluff?"; date and place of interview unspecified; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] "An agreement on eliminating Euromissiles can be prepared in 3 or 4, or at most 5 or 6, months. But for this to happen, desire and good will are needed on both sides," V.P. Karpov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Administration for Problems of Arms Limitation and Disarmament, stressed in an interview for IZVESTIYA. However, he noted that "if, instead of a real agreement, they try to palm us off with a scrap of paper covering up the preservation of the U.S. nuclear missile potential in Europe, we will not agree to that."

[Shalnev] The other day the U.S. Army deputy chief of staff made the following statement: If a Euromissiles agreement is reached with the Soviet Union, the U.S. Army intends to turn the NATO medium-range missiles deployed in Europe into short-range missiles. How are such statements to be assessed?

[Karpov] Unfortunately, that is not the position of the U.S. Army deputy chief of staff alone. That is also the official U.S. position at the Geneva talks. The proposals submitted by the U.S. delegation at Geneva provide for the possibility of converting medium-range missiles, in particular, the Pershing-2 missiles, into missiles with a shorter-than-medium range. In fact, to do this you need only remove the second stage from the Pershing-2 missiles. If this proposal were followed, then effectively all 108 Pershings would remain in Europe — and, moreover, the installations servicing them would be preserved too. In addition, the United States is proposing that the cruise missiles deployed in Europe not be destroyed either, but be transported elsewhere for deployment on surface ships and submarines, for instance. In other words, Washington would clearly like to retain all these medium-range means, but merely under another label. The following fact is also of considerable importance: If Pershing-2 missiles can be easily converted to Pershing-1 missiles or the Pershing-1B version of them, it will clearly be just as easy to restore them to their original status by adding a second stage.

To sum up, I would say this: There is more and more evidence that the United States does not really want the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe, that the "zero option" was a bluff right from the start, and that Washington by no means wanted a situation in which it would have to eliminate the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles. As for us, we are prepared to eliminate all our medium-range missiles in Europe and to destroy all the SS-20's -- and there are 243 of them -- along with their launchers. We would like the United States to act in the same way. To this end we are proposing that the dismantling and destruction of the missiles be rigorously monitored [kontrol]. The bases where missiles are sited must be monitored and inspected [stat obyektom kontrolya, obyektom inspektsii]. The same goes for the relevant enterprises.

[Shalnev] What about the private U.S. enterprises that produce the Pershings, say? What if the administration of these enterprises states that there can be no question of any inspection [inspektsiya] -- by anyone?

[Karpov] Domestic legislation must not impede the implementation of international commitments, especially in something as important as the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. If an understanding is reached on eliminating medium-range missiles, there must be a reliable system of monitoring [kontrol]. References to domestic legislation can in no way serve as an excuse. If U.S. law prevents the carrying out of inspections [inspektsii] at private enterprises, it must be changed. The inspectors must be guaranteed access wherever necessary. There will be no problems on our side: The requisite inspection [inspektsiya] and the requisite monitoring [kontrol] will be ensured by the Soviet state in precise accordance with the commitments made under the treaty.

[Shalnev] You said: "If an understanding is reached..." Why "if"? Do you have any doubts?

[Karpov] Some elements of doubt remains. If the administration retains the position I have mentioned, what are we supposed to do -- embark on deception and simply sign a meaningless scrap of paper? We are interested in ensuring that an agreement is a real contribution to ensuring European security and ridding Europe of the nuclear threat. And if instead of this they try to palm us off with a scrap of paper in order to cover up the preservation of the U.S. nuclear missile potential, we will not agree to this.

[Shalnev] A different topic. The White House confirmed recently that it regards the so-called "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty as "legally justified." But what does the actual history of the talks that resulted in the reaching of the ABM agreement show? What does the process of the ratification of that agreement by the U.S. Senate show?

[Karpov] One thing: The only valid interpretation is the one that in fact was enshrined in the treaty from the outset -- the narrow interpretation, an interpretation designed to prevent large-scale ABM systems. It was only on the basis of that narrow interpretation that the treaty was ratified by the Senate, and the administration, as is confirmed by an analysis carried out by Senator Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has no right to attach any other interpretation to the treaty without the Senate's consent.

[Shalnev] Some voices in the United States are advocating that the documents of the talks that led to the ABM Treaty be declassified so that the groundlessness of the administration's attempts to lend to the treaty a meaning different from that invested in it in 1972 can finally be made clear. Is this a good idea?

[Karpov] The main thing is the treaty itself. It says everything extremely clearly. As you know, the talks went on for several years. Quite naturally, during this process both sides expressed the most diverse viewpoints, which were later developed and supplemented, for instance, by taking the other side's viewpoint into account. In general, there was a process of seeking a solution. It was a kind of creative laboratory, and ideas emerged in the course of laboratory research only to die later. And these -- let's call them -- "dead-end ideas" will scarcely contribute anything now to understanding the essence of what happened during those years. The main thing is analysis of the treaty itself and its attendant documents. And this analysis unambiguously leads to the interpretation to which the Soviet Union subscribes and to which the United States also subscribed before October 1985, when Washington began the process of "reinterpreting" the treaty.

[Shalnev] One final point. Monday is the 4th anniversary of President Reagan's announcement of the "Strategic Defense Initiative." Have these 4 years brought the world closer to the goal for whose sake, so Washington claims, the SDI was conceived -- the goal of ridding mankind of nuclear weapons?

[Karpov] When he announced the SDI, President Reagan admitted that together with the nuclear offensive potential, the SDI program could be seen as evidence of aggressive intentions. Now we are obtaining more and more facts corroborating that conclusion. These facts directly indicate that the SDI is not evidence of intentions to rid the world of nuclear weapons. It is evidence of intentions to create a potential that would provide the United States with the possibility of waging a nuclear war in the hope of winning it. ARMS CONTROL TODAY, a journal published in Washington, remarked in a recent issue that the SDI is, in addition to everything else, a "tight defense against any arms control measures." The essence of the SDI program is very accurately put.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRAVDA REVIEW OF WEEK'S INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

PM231110 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Mar 87 First Edition p 4

[Boris Averchenko "International Review"]

[Excerpt] The Demand of Millions [subhead]

Last week M.S. Gorbachev's statement on the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe remained at the center of the international public's attention. Millions of people see this new initiative as clear confirmation of the USSR's consistent, peace-loving policy and its constructive approach to the resolution of complex international problems.

However, the peoples' desire to rid the cradle of civilization, Europe, of its nuclear burden as quickly as possible is not to everyone's liking. The facts show that the aggressive circles of imperialism, and above all American imperialism, intend to continue the course of further strengthening their military potential for interference in other states' internal affairs.

An official 3-day visit to Spain by U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger ended this week. Local observers report that the guest from across the ocean again tried to persuade the Spaniards of the impermissibility of implementing their demand for the total withdrawal of American military personnel from the USAF bases at Torrejon de Ardos and Zaragoza, as well as of the 72 F-16 fighter-bombers. But the Spaniards are not about to change their view on this score. This is eloquently shown, in particular, by the fact that a few hours before the American secretary's arrival peace campaigners held a 100,000-strong "March on Torrejon de Ardos" under the slogan "American military bases -- out!"

Trying to impose his will on the Spanish Government, Weinberger claimed that the United States needs these bases "to cover NATO's south flank and Spain's own security." The Pentagon leader, the newspaper NUEVO RUMBO writes, would do well to "remember" that Spain does not take part in the activity of NATO's military components and therefore is not subordinate to the bloc's supreme command. The newspaper observes that the U.S. defense secretary's statements are a new manifestation of undisguised interference in Spanish sovereign affairs and the attempt to conduct talks with Spain from a position of strength.

Attention also must focus on another remark by the American traveler, who stated that an agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe... will lead to the growth of the strategic significance of U.S. military bases abroad. So that, it turns

out, is the crux of the matter. Having agreed in principle to the Soviet proposal on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe and on the drawing up of a joint draft treaty on this problem, Washington immediately has begun to step up activity to strengthen U.S. military bases around the European continent that are targeted on the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries.

Washington recently has sharply stepped up the pressure on Greece, where, despite the demand of the vast majority of the population for the elimination of American bases, the United States seeks not only to keep them, but to modernize them.

The Washington administration, resorting to the stick and the carrot approach, secured an extension to 1990 of the American-Turkish agreement on cooperation in the sphere of defense and the economy. Under this agreement, concluded in 1980, the United States gained the right to have on Turkish territory approximately 60 military bases and facilities, including electronic espionage stations targeted on the USSR.

C. Weinberger immediately went to Ankara to transfer the extended agreement to the practical plane. With the help of promises of military and economic aid, Washington wants to tie Turkey more closely to NATO's plans and drag this country, with its important strategic location, into U.S. military preparations.

From the very first day of its birth, the Soviet state has consistently pursued a peace-loving course. "But while international reaction is spurring on the arms race, until it renounces the policy of revanche and 'crusades' against socialism," the appeal from our party's Central Committee "To the Soviet People" says, "the CPSU and the Soviet state will do everything necessary to maintain at the necessary level the defensive might of our country and the socialist community. Soviet people can be sure: We will never permit imperialist military superiority under any circumstances."

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET COMMENTARIES ON FRENCH INF STANCE

Paris 'Hawks'

PM191430 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Mar 87 Second Edition p 7

[Own correspondent V. Bolshakov report: "'Euromissiles' and France's Position"]

[Text] Paris, March — "No Pershings, no SS-20's!" — that was the slogan put forward in France at a peace demonstration on 25 October 1981. In the same year, F. Mitterrand, the Socialist Party's presidential candidate, conducted his election campaign under the same slogan.

The situation is different today. "'No Pershings, no SS-20's' is no longer merely a slogan on a placard," the newspaper L'HUMANITE writes, "but a real prospect. The Soviet Union is proposing to scrap the 'Euromissiles.' Europe now has an opportunity to get rid of the means of its own destruction."

M.S. Gorbachev's 28 February statement was assessed in dozens of states not only as an important new initiative by the USSR, but as an indication of the flexibility of Soviet policy on disarmament issues. The farsightedness and scale of the USSR's decision to "untie" the Reykjavik package and, singling out the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe, conclude a separate agreement on it, and, moreover, without delay, is noted. It is clear, after all, that in a broad context this proposal takes into account the interests not only of European states, but also of Asia and the Western hemisphere. Even Washington did not reject our proposal out of hand. So what attitude was adopted in Paris?

At first, it was like this. Here are some typical Paris newspaper headlines from the first week in March: "Positive Reaction in NATO and the United States to the Soviet Proposals, Skepticism in France" (LE MATIN); "Gorbachev's Proposal and France's Isolation" (LIBERATION); "France: A Special Case" (LE FIGARO); "Paris — Playing the Lead in Atlanticism" (L'HUMANITE).

What was the basis for these press assessments? Paris' political approach, of course. This approach was highly unusual.

Let me remind you that in the conditions of, as they say here, "cohabitation" between President F. Mitterrand, elected to that post from the Socialist Party, and the right-wing majority government headed by Prime Minister J. Chirac, the Elysee Palace (the president's residence) and the Hotel Matignon (the prime minister's residence) have by no means always acted in unison recently. Perhaps in only one area, with the exception of small differences which are not fundamental, has a "consensus" emerged between them — on the approach to the problems of disarmament and nuclear tests.

This happened because soon after 1981, the Socialist Party leaders moved away from the slogan "No Pershings, no SS-20's!" As early as February 1983, speaking in the FRG Bundestag, President Mitterrand came out in favor of the siting of American first-strike missiles in Western Europe. At approximately the same time the Socialist Party adopted their program for the arms race, which was taken up with a few amendments by the right-wing cabinet that came to power in 1986. The "consensus" arose on this basis. Both the Right and the Socialists have sworn loyalty to the concepts of "deterrence" and the "balance of fear," that is, the strategy on which NATO is based. They also agreed that maintaining and improving France's nuclear forces is the sole guarantee of its security and its great-power status. On that basis Paris has reacted sensitively to any initiatives in the sphere of disarmament or the ending of nuclear tests.

However, French President F. Mitterrand and Prime Minister J. Chirac preferred, as a rule, not to comment directly on the Soviet peace initiatives. That right was granted either to the ministers directly involved in foreign policy and defense (J. -B. Raimond and A. Giraud), or to those members of the government who have nothing to do with this, but are always willing to speak out on any aspect of Soviet-French relations. That was the case this time.

On 1 March, the French Foreign Ministry published a communique reporting that its position has basically not changed since Foreign Minister J. -B. Raimond described the accords between the USSR and the United States in Reykjavik as "frightening." The document said that France is not opposed to the elimination of nuclear weapons in principle, but considers it unacceptable for Europe at the present time because of the existing "imbalance" in favor of the Warsaw Pact in conventional and chemical weapons, as well as tactical missiles with nuclear warheads.

French Defense Minister A. Giraud went even further, stating in an interview for LE FIGARO: "If the disposition could not be agreed on in Reykjavik is agreed on in Geneva, this will cause tremendous concern."

LE FIGARO, for its part, in an editorial headed "An Obvious Trap," claimed that Gorbachev's latest proposal must be treated with the utmost caution. The simultaneous dismantling of the Soviet SS-20's and American Pershing-2 and cruise missiles, the newspaper wrote, could create a situation which "it would be suicidal" to accept.

Of course, France's political spectrum is wide. But only the French Communist Party, while all the country's other parties were talking about the "danger" of the new Soviet peace initiative, appealed to reason, demonstrating that the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe accords in the highest degree with France's national interests and security. Despite the persecution of Communists in the press, their position found understanding among many French people.

The Elysee Palace followed very attentively the political battles of the first few days of March. Undoubtedly they gained an increasing awareness that France, with its "special position," was isolated. The hope that Bonn and London would come out against the Soviet proposal was not justified. Moreover, Washington gave it a positive response.

After this, the French cabinet was convened with urgency under F. Mitterrand's chairmanship. At the session, the president of the republic in effect disavowed the statement issued earlier by the French Foreign Ministry. the president stated that he

studied M.S. Gorbachev's proposal "with genuine interest" and believes that the prospect of eliminating Soviet and American medium-range nuclear weapons should be "balanced, synchronized, and verifiable," while an agreement on such a reduction should be linked to talks on short-range missiles. F. Mitterrand also recalled his well-known stance to the effect that the French nuclear assault forces, "which ensure France's security through deterrence, cannot be equated to intermediate nuclear forces or taken into account at talks between the United States and the USSR."

The president's opinion was decisive, since under the Constitution he is the commander in chief of the Armed Forces and is responsible for France's defense policy. J. Chirac, who spoke after F. Mitterrand, agreed with his stance, stating that there is now "complete identity" of views between the president and the government.

The cabinet decision to support the USSR's proposal on the terms listed by F. Mitterrand caused a storm of indignation in the right-wing majority. The leaders of the Union for French Democracy [UDF], the biggest bloc of right-wing parties, came out at once against the "complete identity" referred to by J. Chirac. Again and again on the radio and television and through the newspapers they state that the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe is an "extremely dangerous" thing and that Washington "is leaving Europe defenseless."

Characterizing the emerging situation, the French newspapers write that "after the Elysee Palace had imposed its view on the Hotel Matignon, the 'latest crisis' erupted in the right-wing coalition." The press reported that at the cabinet session, A. Giraud described a possible agreement between Moscow and Washington on medium-range nuclear missiles as a "new Munich." Jean-Claude Gaudin, chairman of the UDF group in the National Assembly, took a similar stance. The leader of the extreme right "National Front," Le Pen, called for "heightened vigilance" among his supporters. For former Prime Minister R. Barre and his entourage, the cabinet decision provided a pretext once again to criticize the practice of "cohabitation" between the president and the prime minister. He declared that this time it has led "to the weakening of the defense of France and all of Europe."

This reaction by the Paris "hawks" is characteristic. They obviously do not intend to "give way," and will continue to try to impose not only on France, but on the whole of Western Europe a "special position," that is, a course of sabotaging any accords on nuclear disarmament.

It also is obvious that an awareness of the nuclear danger and an understanding of the indissoluble link between France's security and its active participation in the disarmament process have not yet reached the broad strata of the country's population. Communists and other progressive forces in France are doing staunch publicity work. The struggle is not easy. But only its successful outcome will guarantee a peaceful future and true greatness for France.

'Anti-Soviet Spy Passions'

LD241436 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 24 Mar 87

[Excerpts] The latest anti-Soviet spy campaign unleashed in France is clearly beginning to run out of steam because of the lack of any serious evidence. Our correspondent Oleg Maksimenko reports from Paris:

Soviet agents wanted to steal the secrets of the French "Ariane" space rocket! It is essential to increase vigilance! Soviet spies are everywhere! From the end of last week television and radio have been inflaming the French, and the front pages of the central newspapers have been scaring them with loud headlines. But a few days have passed and the anti-Soviet spy passions have started to dwindle noticeably. What is the issue in this case?

One could simply throw one's arms in the air and quote the traditional French saying -- always look for the woman in everything -- were it not for the fact that it is a matter of interstate relations. In this case a known lie, concocted in the tradition of the shoddiest examples of pulp fiction was sent pulsing through the official channels of French television and radio, close political circles, and newspapers. The question is why was it suddenly necessary to provoke mistrust and unfriendliness toward our country among the French yet again? I think one should look for the answer in the enormous effect which has been produced here by the latest Soviet peace initiative on the elimination of the U.S. and our Euromissiles. People evidently wanted to instill in the minds of the French the idea that the USSR cannot be trusted under any circumstances. There was evidently a miscalculation with the pseudo craze about the "Ariane" rocket secrets. The statements by the father of Pierre Verdier have restrained the local anti-Soviets, but for how long, one may ask?

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRAVDA HITS WEU INVOLVEMENT IN INF ISSUE

PM241157 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Mar 87 First Edition p 5

[Vladimir Bolshakov "Commentator's Column:" "What Kind of an Initiative?"]

[Text] Paris -- French President Francois Mitterrand has expressed support for the idea of Jacques Delors, president of the EEC Commission, to convene the EEC Council of Ministers to elaborate a common stance among West European heads of government toward M.S. Gorbachev's 28 February statement on the elimination of medium-range missiles from Europe.

As is known, this Soviet initiative has met with a positive response in Washington and in many West European capitals, including Paris. USSR-U.S. talks are underway on the elaboration of a specific agreement based on the Soviet and American proposals. What then is behind the EEC Commission president's proposals? F. Mitterrand explained: "Mr Delors' initiative is a good one. These questions are being discussed within NATO and the Western European Union [WEU]."

Yet, allow me to note that up to now the "Common Market," as distinct from NATO and the WEU, was not considered a suitable forum for discussing military-political problems. Has the EEC commission decided to change the nature and thrust of this economic grouping's work? Politicians are now frequently asking this kind of question in their comments and utterances. At the same time, by no means everyone shares Delors' idea. Belgium, for instance, which is currently acting as EEC chairman, has categorically rejected this. Misgivings also have been expressed in a number of other capitals.

Naturally, this does not preclude the current discussion of the possible consequences of the conclusion of a USSR-U.S. agreement on the elimination of medium-range nuclear means. An entirely natural quest for foreign and defense policy guidelines is underway in West Europe. It would seem that these guidelines should indicate to the West European countries how they can contribute to the process of disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons from our continent and the world as a whole.

Alas, another logic sometimes prevails in these discussions. With increasing frequency appeals are heard to strengthen "European defenses" and create an additional "pillar of NATO." It is characteristic that, simultaneously with a number of French representatives, G. Howe, head of the British Foreign Office, also has come out in favor of such a "strengthening of West European defense" almost, as it were, in response to the possible elimination of medium-range missiles. [paragraph continues]

It is obvious that certain forces in both France and Britain are not averse to reviving the old idea of transforming the WEU into something in the line of a military bloc.

All "initiatives" of this kind clearly do not pursue the aim of strengthening real security in West Europe, but gave the way toward an escalation of the arms race, including the nuclear arms race. The shortsightedness of such a course is particularly clear in the light of the emerging prospect of ridding Europe of medium-range missiles, to which the Soviet proposals are geared.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS ON UK INVOLVEMENT IN NATO NUCLEAR BUILDUP EFFORT

PM241149 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Mar 87 First Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Kept Secret From Everyone: Britain's Participation in NATO Nuclear Efforts"]

[Text] London, 23 Mar -- The Tory cabinet has been keeping the facts of London's involvement in NATO's nuclear arsenal buildup efforts secret not only from the public but also from parliament. This is described by the newspaper THE OBSERVER.

Despite repeated requests from MPs, high-ranking government members have denied that Britain has been taking part in the implementation of such plans by the North Atlantic bloc.

Nevertheless, according to THE OBSERVER, which cites the research of a British scientist, D. Plesch, representatives of NATO, including Britain, taking part in a meeting of the nuclear planning group in Montebello, not only took "certain decisions," but have begun implementing them. [paragraph continues]

Two new 155 mm and 203 mm nuclear artillery shells already have been created under the modernization program approved by those representatives. The shells, which may be used as neutron weapons, D. Plesch writes, are already being accepted by the FRG Army. Britain, according to Plesch, also has agreed in principle to accept the shells.

In addition, 500 new surface-to-surface missiles and 500 new short-range cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads will be created and deployed. The latter will be deployed on U.S. F-16 fighter bombers and the multirole "Tornado" aircraft, which are in service with the air forces of a number of West European states. These nuclear warheads, the newspaper writes, are basic to NATO's doctrine of delivering a "first strike" against the Warsaw Pact countries.

In the newspaper's opinion, the Cabinet, afraid of large new antiwar demonstrations in the country, such as what had happened over the deployment of the U.S. medium-range cruise missiles, is hushing up the facts about London's involvement in NATO's aggressive preparations.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW PRAISES UK LABOR PARTY'S 'BOLD' DISARMAMENT STAND

LD250114 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1745 GMT 24 Mar 87

[Viktor Levin commentary from the "International Diary -- Events, Facts, Opinions" program, presented by Igor Surguchev]

[Text] [Surguchev] Kinnock, the leader of the British Labor Party, has addressed a news conference in London where the document entitled "Europe, the New Detente" was presented.

Addressing journalists, Kinnock noted that in the event of a Labor government coming to power it would veto Great Britain's participation in research work under Reagan's SDI program. This report will be commented upon by my colleague Viktor Levin:

[Levin] Kinnock's statement was very interesting, not just because of its content. It is also interesting because of when it was made. The point is that on 25 March, Kinnock sets off on a visit to the United States where on Friday, according to available data, he is to meet with President Reagan in the White House.

On the eve of the Labor leader's trip across the ocean, the British bourgeois press, in my view, sought to create the impression that Kinnock was ready to make great concessions to the United States in the sphere of nuclear weapons.

You obviously remember that Labor adopted a very bold and far-reaching program for Britain's nuclear disarmament. Our policy, Kinnock said, consists of delivering Britain from nuclear weapons, of canceling the Trident program, of dismantling Polaris, and of giving up tactical nuclear weapons. In accordance with these plans, the U.S. cruise missile bases in Greenham Common and Molesworth must be closed.

This policy irritates the Conservatives, who do not want to hear of giving up nuclear weapons. It also irritates them because Labor's position enjoys wide support.

Recently, when the Soviet Union proposed to resolve separately the questions of scrapping U.S. and Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, Britain's Laborites -- who have always advocated the Zero option, that is to say the complete scrapping of U.S. and Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles -- stated that they welcome the possibility, which has opened up, of solving this problem. In this context, Kinnock let it be understood that in the event of his party coming to power it would not pose the question of the immediate withdrawal of U.S. cruise missiles and would await the reaching of an accord at the Soviet-U.S. talks. On the basis of this fact, THE TIMES, for instance, hastened to draw the conclusion that Kinnock was changing his position on cruise missiles. This decision is presented as a departure from a position of principle.

It seems to me that there are no grounds for such a conclusion. Yes, the Laborites, if the report on the possibility of retaining the U.S. missiles until the completion of the talks is in accordance with reality, are modifying their tactics, but their strategic line aimed at the complete removal of nuclear weapons on the country's territory is preserved.

In matters of principle, the Laborites remain in their previous positions. The statement with which you have familiarized yourselves -- I have in mind the statement regarding a Labor government's intention to veto the participation of British firms in developing the SDI program -- vividly testifies to this. The fact that this statement was made on the very eve of Kinnock's visit to the United States shows that the Laborites, unlike the Conservatives, do not intend to oblige Washington.

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CSO: 5200/1377

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

THATCHER: INF ACCORD MUST COVER SHORTER RANGE MISSILES

Initial Reaction to Gorbachev

London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 4 Mar 87 p 1

[Article by George Jones]

[Text]

IN HER first public statement on the Russian proposal to eliminate intermediate nuclear weapons in Europe, Mrs Thatcher insisted yesterday that any deal must include shorter range missiles.

The search for agreement on the reduction of nuclear arms will dominate the Prime Minister's five-day visit to the Soviet Union at the end of the month. She will fly to Moscow on March 28, returning on April 1.

Mrs Thatcher also hopes to assess the significance of the recent reforms implemented by Mr Gorbachev. She is keen to know whether the moves towards a more open Soviet society, including the release of dissidents, represents a deep-seated and genuine change in Kremlin attitudes.

In the Commons yesterday, she welcomed as a "useful step forward" the offer by Mr Gorbachev to negotiate the removal of middle range nuclear missiles.

But she repeatedly refused to give Mr Kinnock, Labour

leader, an assurance that she would not make the elimination of the American cruise and perishing missiles and the Russian SS20s conditional on reductions in other tactical and shorter range missiles.

Mrs Thatcher insisted that the Soviet Union had total superiority in short-range systems which were capable of reaching this country.

"Unless we deal with shorter range systems at the same time, we are leaving a total preponderance of such systems in the hands of the Soviet Union and very few in the hands of Western Europe," she said.

Mr Kinnock said afterwards that it was now obvious that the Prime Minister intended to make any agreement to eliminate intermediate nuclear forces from Europe conditional upon finalised agreement on other weapons.

"Her desire to impede progress is obvious, self-indulgent and pointless and it must not be allowed to inhibit the nuclear arms reductions which the superpowers and the people of Europe clearly want."

Remarks in Parliament

London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 4 Mar 87 p 12

[Article by William Weekes]

[Text]

SOVIET PROPOSALS for the removal of intermediate range nuclear weapons from Europe were welcomed as a useful step forward by Mrs Thatcher in the Commons. Western strength and resolve had been crucial in reaching this point, she said.

Such a move by Mr Gorbachev would never have come from Mr Kinnock's unilateralist policies, she added.

Strict verification procedures and negotiations to correct the huge imbalance in favour of the Soviet Union in shorter-range systems were absolutely vital, said Mrs Thatcher. She was pressed by Mr KINNOCK not to make the elimination of intermediate nuclear weapons conditional on agreement to reduce short-range and tactical nuclear forces.

"The best route now to the reduction of those tactical and shorter range forces is through the elimination of the intermediate forces," Mr Kinnock said.

'Throw away'

"Would you now say whether you are going to turn your back on this current opportunity or encourage it... bearing in mind you once said, rightly, that no weapons would be better than some, but fewer would be better than more?"

Keeping up her attack on Labour's unilateralist stance, Mrs THATCHER told Mr Kinnock: "I believe the proposals which have come from Moscow stem from the resolve of the West to stand firm, and would never have come from any of your policies.

"You would throw away the security of our defence systems too easily."

Mrs Thatcher drew attention to Russian superiority in shorter-range nuclear systems capable of reaching Britain.

"You would throw away our own security and defence. I would consider these shorter range systems along with the intermediate range ones."

Responding to Sir Frederic Bennett (C. Torbay), the Prime Minister said: "Unless we deal with shorter-range systems at the same time, we are leaving a total preponderance of such systems in the hands of the Soviet Union and very few hands of Western Europe."

"That would not be enhancing our security, but taking certain risks."

Dr OWEN, SDP leader, maintained that there was nothing more absurd than lessons on nuclear arms control negotiations from Mr Kinnock.

He said it would be foolish to link negotiations on intermediate nuclear forces with reductions in conventional forces or a ban on chemical weapons, desirable though they were.

Dr Owen urged Mrs Thatcher to make it clear to other European countries that the negotiations on intermediate range nuclear forces stood on their own as part of the "zero zero option."

Mrs Thatcher "I believe that to keep the security of the West and Nato we must look at it all together.

"I believe we can go ahead as a matter of priority with intermediate range weapons, but we must also look at the same time at shorter-range weapons.

If we succeed in getting agreement on that matter there is enhanced importance for our own nuclear deterrent, and I shall be delighted when you agree to update Polaris with Trident," she told Dr Owen.

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CSO: 5240/057

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

EUROPEAN REACTION TO GORBACHEV INF PROPOSAL ASSESSED

London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 11 Mar 87 p 12

[Article by Defense Correspondent John Keegan: "Can Europe Profit From a Zero-Zero Bargain?"]

[Excerpts]

THERE IS a good, old fashioned, hard-headed ring to "Nowt for nowt" and Mr James Callaghan's warning, in as many words, to the Commons on Monday that nowt is what the Russians are likely to give in return for the unilateral abandonment of Trident will carry a lot of conviction with old-fashioned Labour voters.

But the former Prime Minister's homely advice has a message for many others outside traditional Labour constituencies. At a time when the present Prime Minister is being urged to respond positively and constructively to Mr Gorbachev's initiative on the zero-zero option it should remind those keenest to grasp his offer at face value that the best bargains are those that benefit both sides.

There is little evidence at the moment that the Gorbachev initiative will benefit Britain or Europe. It is, of course, not a Soviet initiative at all, but the response desired by Nato — which it has taken eight years to extract — to the Alliance's original decision of 1979 to deploy its own Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF).

What ought to be the European objective in the negotiations as they develop? Zero-zero, it might be remembered, does not actually mean the elimination of INF but their reduction to 100 on each side. In that context, Europe should make its platform "zero-zero-zero-zero" — reductions to equal levels of INF,

battlefield nuclear weapons and conventional forces by linked and interdependent agreement.

Let us by all means hope that President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev reach a zero-zero settlement but it will be for Mrs Thatcher and her fellow European leaders to require penalty clauses written into the contract, as in any hard-headed, commercial understanding. Not only must Britain and France hold the Soviet Union to its declaration that their independent nuclear forces fall outside the INF discussions, the Europeans must also insist that staged withdrawals of INF should be contingent upon complementary reductions of battlefield nuclear weapons and on similar reductions of conventional forces, all to be verified by on-site inspection at short-term notification.

A breach of contract should be penalised by the redeployment of weapons previously withdrawn. The Soviet Union will no doubt resist penalty clauses and would cry "aggression" if they were invoked. But Russia's unilateral deployment of its "cruiser" fleet of INF was aggressive from the start. The only explanation for this deployment was as a direct threat to the European half of Nato. Western Europe must now insist that no superpower bargain leaves it to face Russian threats, of whatever form, which it lacks the means to deter on its own.

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CSO: 5240/056

INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

GORBACHEV PROPOSAL STILL LEAVES SRINF ISSUE

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 3 Mar 87 p 2

[Editorial by Rafael Paro: "An Agreement Within Reach"]

[Text] The greatest usefulness of an INF agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would be reflected on the political level. It would be a large step in the reduction of mistrust.

In a certain way, a circle is now closing. The Soviet Union's party chief, Mikhail Gorbachev, has proposed a separate agreement on a "zero solution" for intermediate range ballistic missiles in Europe. This happens about ten years after the Soviet Union began to deploy a so-called Eurostrategic missile of very good accuracy, the SS-20.

Then one began in Western Europe to feel uneasy about the European strategic balance. Up till then one had become accustomed in the West to the fact that the Soviet Union had achieved approximate parity with the U.S. in intercontinental ballistic missiles.

At the same time that one admitted in the Western camp that the bilateral deterrence, the ability of the super powers to deter one another from nuclear attack, was functioning, one also pointed out that the American and the Soviet intercontinental weapons tended to neutralize one another. The situation was seen to undermine the U.S.'s possibilities by means of a nuclear weapons threat against the Soviet Union to protect Western Europe from attack.

While the discussion smoldered in Western Europe on the U.S.'s readiness to use intercontinental nuclear weapons to protect the West Europeans, the deployment of the Soviet SS-20 began, which has a range of 5,000 kilometers. Uneasiness in the West about the Eurostrategic balance led gradually to NATO's so-called double decision in December 1979. The resolution meant that NATO toward the end of 1983 would begin to deploy 572 American Pershing II and cruise missiles if did not before in the negotiations with the Soviet Union reach an acceptable balance in the area.

These so-called INF negotiations (INF = Intermediate Nuclear Forces) were begun in November 1981. The opening American offer in the INF negotiations was the so-called zero solution. This meant in brief that the decision on the 572

missiles in Western Europe would be nullified if Moscow agreed to dismantle its intermediate range missiles, not just the SS-20, but also the earlier types SS-4 and SS-5.

The Soviet Union made several counter proposals and calculated on considerable support from antinuclear opinion in Western Europe. But the negotiations got stuck, the deployment of the American missiles began, and the Soviet Union ended the negotiations.

When Reagan and Gorbachev met in Reykjavik in October of last year one calculated that the Soviet Union had 112 SS-4 and 441 SS-20 missiles deployed, while the U.S. had 108 Pershing II and 144 cruise missiles.

In Reykjavik there was agreement on some essential matters. Among them was the important one that the Soviet Union gave up its demand to consider the intermediate range weapons stationed in Europe strategic. (American INF can reach targets in the Soviet Union, but Soviet ones do not reach targets in the U.S. to the same extent). On the Soviet side one therefore removed the question of the advanced weapons systems (aircraft and fleet) from the agenda.

Reagan and Gorbachev agreed to dismantle intermediate range missiles in Europe. In Asia the Soviet Union would retain 100 warheads on intermediate range missiles, and the U.S. would be allowed to have just as many on its territory. In addition, the gentlemen were ready to freeze the number of short distance missiles in Europe, that is, operative tactical missiles with a range of 300 to 1,000 kilometers. According to Western sources the Soviet Union has 600-700 such missiles deployed in Europe. The U.S. has 72 old Pershing I's.

In the tug-of-war in past years on nuclear armaments in Europe, the French and English weapons have been a special problem. In spite of the fact that together they only represent in number and striking force a fraction of the arsenal of the super powers, Moscow still wants to include the French and British weapons in the East-West balance. It was a concession by Gorbachev when he last year gave notice that French and British weapons can be left out of an American-Soviet agreement on INF -- provided that the nuclear weapons strength of France and Great Britain remain the same as the present. The problem is an urgent one. In both countries there are plans for considerable expansion.

A separate agreement on INF between the Soviet Union and the U.S. was within reach in Reykjavik. But everything came to nothing when Gorbachev put everything together in one package: INF, strategic weapons, and space weapons. The agreement on space weapons would have put restraints on Reagan's dream of a "space shield," SDI, and therefore there was no agreement.

Now Gorbachev has opened his package and taken out the question of intermediate range weapons and suggested a separate agreement based on the principle of a zero solution for Europe. The Soviet Union will be satisfied with 33 SS-20's with three warheads each in Asia. The U.S. can deploy 100 warheads on intermediate range missiles in Alaska.

At first glance the proposal seems straightforward and simple. Europe would return to the situation that ruled before 1977. But it is not quite so simple. Right after Reykjavik the question of short distance missiles aroused increased interest in the Western camp. After their meeting in December, NATO's foreign and defense ministers wrote in their communique that an INF agreement cannot leave unconsidered the inequality now existing in nuclear missiles of shorter range. It would have to include a requirement for further negotiations on weapons of this type.

A freeze on the present number will possibly not be sufficient for U.S. allies. Moscow has already suggested a concession: it is ready to dismantle the "missile palisade" of operative tactical missiles that was deployed in the GDR and also Czechoslovakia, as a countermove to the American Pershing II and cruise missiles.

In the security policy debate that started in Europe, the conditions now appear much stronger that contributed to the fact that Western military experts were actually quite anxious to accept the challenge implied in the the Soviet Union's deployment of SS-20 missiles. American intermediate range weapons in Europe were seen as a way to bind the U.S. tighter to European defense. A Soviet attack should be met with a "flexible response." Western Europe should not be dependent upon the Americans' readiness to use the most extreme resource, the strategic intercontinental missiles.

There are also objections to this reasoning. Leonid Breshnev stressed that the Soviet Union would use its strategic missile strength upon a U.S. attack with intermediate range weapons from European territory. Some people have suggested that the U.S. with INF was preparing itself for a "limited nuclear war" in Europe.

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has stressed the significance of the psychological ties between the U.S. and its Western European allies by suggesting that INF should not be cut down to zero, but by the same percentages as the strategic weapons.

A zero solution today is just as desirable as it was ten years ago. But the technical development of weapons that has taken place and the new military doctrines that have seen the light of day in this time unfortunately signify that the effect of disarmament can no longer mean as much as in the middle of the 1970's.

The greatest usefulness of an INF agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would be reflected on the political level. It would be a large and concrete step to reduce mistrust between the two leading super powers. This in spite of the fact that in certain European circles one will feel abandoned.

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CSO: 5200/2507

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

VATICAN RADIO: SIGNS OF 'NUCLEAR DISASTER' AT SOVIET MISSILE BASE

LD241000 Vatican City International Service in Lithuanian 0430 GMT 22 Mar 87

[Text] Speculations have been circulating in the West today about a nuclear disaster in Estonia.

According to the foreign press the disaster occurred in Keila-Joa near the Gulf of Finland at the USSR missile base in which [words indistinct] medium-range nuclear missiles are targeted.

Last week people living around the base were greatly surprised that during the night all the USSR soldiers as well as the civilian staff at the base were suddenly evacuated without leaving even [words indistinct]. At the same time sheep began dying in the fields. Veterinarians ascertained the cause of death was leukemia. It was established that sheep [words indistinct] which leads to the belief that the springs have been contaminated with radioactive material.

Official Soviet sources have made no announcement about the disaster nor do they answer inhabitants' inquiries. [passage indistinct] People in Scandinavian countries as well as in Estonia are greatly concerned about the possible disaster.

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CSO: 5200/1377

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRAVDA REPORTS CZECHOSLOVAK CP SUPPORT ON INF

PM241209 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Mar 87 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "CPCZ Central Committee Plenum Resolution"]

[Excerpts] Prague, 20 March--The CPCZ Central Committee Plenum fully supports the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee January Plenum, which are a revolutionary contribution to implementing key tasks in accelerating society's socioeconomic development, and also supports the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium's measures to utilize the results of the CPSU Central Committee January Plenum. This is emphasized in a CPCZ Central Committee Plenum resolution published in the Czechoslovak press today.

The CPCZ Central Committee, the resolution says, expresses a high opinion of the peace-loving Soviet policy and the resolute steps of the CPSU to strengthen detente, international security, and peace. The CPCZ Central Committee welcomes and wholeheartedly supports the proposal of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to eliminate medium-range missiles from Europe. Its implementation would be an important step toward a nuclear-free world, the resolution emphasizes.

The plenum examined organizational questions. J. Korcak was relieved of his duties as member of the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium at his own request on health grounds. The Plenum elected L. Adamec member of the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium. K. Hoffmann was elected secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee and M. Zavadil member of the CPCZ Central Committee Secretariat.

G. Husak, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, delivered the concluding speech at the plenum.

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CSO: 5200/1377

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BEIJING COMMENTS TO USSR ON USSR-U.S. ARMS TALKS

OW200556 Beijing in Russian to the USSR 1800 GMT 16 Mar 87

["International Affairs" program; studio talk with radio commentator (Hung Bo): "USSR-U.S. Talks on Intermediate-Range Missiles"]

[Text] [Announcer] Dear Soviet listeners: The proposal of the leader of your country, Mikhail Gorbachev, to eliminate intermediate-range missiles in Europe has created a new atmosphere in the U.S.-Soviet talks on intermediate-range missiles, and has attracted the general attention of the world community and the approval of many countries. The question of whether the intermediate-range missile talks can become a breakthrough in promoting the U.S.-Soviet general disarmament talks raises acute interest among the people.

We shall discuss this topic with our radio commentator (Hung Bo) in today's "International Affairs" program.

[(Hung Bo)] You, of course, are well acquainted with the content of Mikhail Gorbachev's new proposal. Particular attention is attracted to this proposal by the fact that the issue of eliminating Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles will be separated from the whole package of problems discussed at the talks, and a separate agreement on this matter will be concluded. The Soviet side then proposed to establish the most efficient verification, including on-site verification, in which each side verifies the other's actions. This is an obvious change in the position of the Soviet Union regarding the disarmament talks since last October's Reykjavik summit meeting.

[Announcer] We should dwell briefly on the whole process of the U.S.-Soviet debate over intermediate-range missiles. The Soviet Union started deployment of the mobile SS-20 intermediate-range missiles in 1977. To counterbalance this, in December 1979, NATO adopted the twin-track decision on U.S. deployment of Pershing-2 and Cruise missiles on the territories of five West European countries, and at the same time demanded that talks be held with the Soviet Union on intermediate-range missiles.

The long and complicated path of the U.S.-Soviet talks has taken its course since then. Since November 1983, the United States has been deploying intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe, according to the plan; as a result the Soviet Union rejected talks and took countermeasures to strengthen its intermediate-and short-range nuclear power in Europe.

[[Hung Bo]] In March 1985, the USSR and the United States resumed talks in Geneva on a wide range of issues — on space and strategic nuclear arms and intermediate-range missiles. The sides widely disagreed on the issue of intermediate-range missiles. The Soviet Union proposed a freeze or reduction of its SS-20 missiles, and called on the American side to stop deployment of its intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe. The United States insisted that either both Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles be completely liquidated, or that parity be retained.

The USSR also insisted on linking British and French intermediate-range nuclear arms to any limit, while the United States objected to this. The USSR proposed that the intermediate-range missile talks be concerned only with missiles in Europe, leaving the question of intermediate-range missiles in Asia for another package of problems, while the United States insisted on retaining the intermediate-range missile parity of both sides from a global viewpoint.

[Announcer] Generally, at the USSR-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik a unity of opinions was reached on the question of European missiles, but with U.S. insistence on maintaining its Star Wars program and the Soviet side's stubborn persistence that the question of intermediate-range missiles be linked with the issue of space weapons, the meeting did not bring about any concrete results. The Soviet Union has now changed its position. Its new proposal has broken the deadlock in the USSR-U.S. disarmament talks, which reached a stalemate after the Reykjavik meeting. But how did this good opportunity appear?

[[Hung Bo]] The international community analyzed this problem differently. For example, people think that the Soviet proposal was made with the aim of slowing down the U.S. arms race and reducing its own heavy burden of military expenditures in the interest of implementing the acceleration strategy developed by the 27th CPSU Congress. Indeed, the USSR demand to solve three aspects of the disarmament question in one package is unrealizable. To give impetus to the arms control talks, the USSR selected the issue of intermediate-range missiles as a breakthrough. This is why public opinion in many countries takes Gorbachev's new proposal as an important positive measure and a substantial step toward resolving the problem of disarmament. Public opinion holds that this proposal will clear the path for reaching agreement on elimination of American and Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Europe.

[Announcer] Thanks to Gorbachev's new proposal, the possibility of reaching U.S.-Soviet agreement on European missiles in the near future has increased. Both sides have now proposed their draft agreements and are optimistically looking at prospects for the talks. The USSR and the United States held a special meeting on 10 March in Geneva on eliminating intermediate-range missiles in Europe. Kampelman, senior representative of the United States, let it be known that there is a possibility of concluding a treaty on eliminating intermediate-range missiles in Europe by the end of this year.

Nevertheless, the talks will not be easy. First of all, the United States has to coordinate further its position on questions of defense with the position of its European allies. Besides, although the USSR has in principle agreed to on-site inspection, it is not known yet whether it will accept all U.S. demands on nuclear verification. Lastly, there are serious disagreements between the United States and the USSR on the issue of short-range missiles. For example, TASS quite recently published a commentary on the fact that the United States included the whole system of Soviet short-range missiles, including the SS-12 and SS-23, in the draft treaty on intermediate-range missiles. It rebuked the United States for complicating the issue

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

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in the talks on European missiles. It is apparent that there is going to be hard bargaining between the USSR and the United States.

[(Hung Bo)] To conclude our discussion, I would like to note that an argument between the two sides may occur over the issue of deployment of the 100 intermediate-range missile warheads by the Soviet Union in Asia and by the United States on its own territory. The Soviet Union has repeatedly emphasized that the American missiles on the Micronesian islands, in South Korea, and other places represent a serious danger to the Asian-Pacific region. This is why the intermediate-range missile talks are not a matter that concerns only the USSR and the United States, but also involves the security of Asian countries, in particular the security of China.

A press spokesman of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the USSR-U.S. talks involve the security of European and Asian states. The issues of security in Europe and Asia are equally important. In connection with this, the Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles in Europe and Asia must be reduced and fully eliminated under the same principle, simultaneously, and uniformly. All people are interested in the direction the Soviet-American talks will take and whether they will be capable of achieving significant progress.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BEIJING REVIEW ON 'CONSTRUCTIVE CONCESSIONS' OF NEW PROPOSAL

Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English 16 Mar 87 pp 10-11

[Article by Xin Di]

[Text]

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced early this month that the Soviet Union is ready to negotiate a separate accord with the United States to rid Europe of medium-range nuclear missiles, indicating a major change in his policies.

Gorbachev said that while the Soviets would insist on a ban on space-based weapons as a condition for reducing long-range nuclear weapons, the Kremlin would not stand in the way of an agreement to eliminate medium-range missiles from Europe. In announcing the new proposal, Gorbachev said, the Politburo was motivated in part by US officials who were "sabotaging accords in each of the (three) areas by pleading that the Soviet Union insists on solving them as a package."

Most nations in Eastern Europe welcomed Gorbachev's suggestion. Democratic German leader Erich Honecker said that his country supports Soviet withdrawal of medium-range missiles from Democratic Germany and he called on West Germany Chancellor Helmut Kohl to capitalize on this historic chance for a non-nuclear world and muster support among his allies for the imple-

mentation of the Soviet proposal. The Hungarian newspaper *Nepszabadsag* said in an editorial that Moscow's "world-shaking" proposal paves the way for concluding the first disarmament accord between the superpowers.

Western Europe has also expressed approval of the Soviet offer, though some anxieties still remain. Lord Carrington, Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), said in Brussels that Gorbachev's proposal appeared to be "a substantial step forward." West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher said the Soviets' proposal paved the way for a treaty to dismantle all US and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe.

The French government has some reservations about the Soviet proposal. A spokesman for the French foreign minister said the "denuclearization" of Europe could give the Warsaw Pact, which has a "lopsided lead in conventional and chemical weapons," "a decisive advantage." The governments of Britain, the Netherlands and Italy were among those who refrained from quick assessments, saying they wanted time to study the Soviet proposal. They are

three of the five NATO countries where 572 of the US Pershing II and cruise missiles are being deployed. West Germany and Belgium are the other two countries.

While many countries expressed cautious optimism over the Soviet proposal, Japan sought a greater role for Asian nations in arms talks. Japan called for the inclusion of Asia in arrangements for the withdrawal of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. The Soviet proposal would leave 100 Soviet missiles in the Asian part of the Soviet Union and allow an equal number in the United States.

Washington has welcomed the Soviet move as a positive step. Though some US officials said the Soviet move was aimed, in part, at increasing opposition among the United States allies to the "broad interpretation" of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty (ABM). Such a reinterpretation would permit expanded testing of space weapons.

After formally receiving the Soviet proposal, Washington has presented its own draft treaty on removing medium-range missiles from Europe and agreed to prolong the current round of talks in Geneva with Moscow on medium-range missiles. But American chief arms negotiator Max Kampelman said it could take six months to reach an agreement. He said verification—Washington insists on on-site verification of missile elimination in Europe—was one of the thorniest issues. The US will also insist on the right to build up to Soviet levels of shorter-range weapons in order to compensate the Western allies for the withdrawal of US Pershing II and cruise missiles.

Since early 1985, the Soviet Union has been insisting that any arms treaty should be linked with accords on two other main issues—strategic or long-range

nuclear weapons and space defense system, US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). This standpoint was of course turned down by the US and referred to as the cause of the deadlock at the Reykjavik summit.

Since the Iceland summit, the relations between the US and the Soviet Union have been again at a nadir and the arms control talks seemed to have closed down for a while. Adding to this, the US first exceeded the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) limits last year by deploying the 131st B-52 bomber with cruise missiles. The Soviets will be in a position this year to exceed SALT II. If they begin deploying SS-24 multiple-warhead missiles, they will have to dismantle SS-17 and SS-19 missiles to stay within the treaty. The deployment of another Typhoon submarine and a Delta IV sub is also expected; this would put the Soviets over the 1,200 missile ceiling on multiple-warhead strategic missiles.

In late February, Moscow announced a nuclear explosion marking an end to a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing which had been extended four times since August 1985. So far, the US has refused to participate in the moratorium, arguing that nuclear tests are essential to its SDI research. The Soviets, they claim, have the advantage in land-based strategic nuclear weapons.

In his 1987 State of the Union message, US President Ronald Reagan reaffirmed his determination to continue with SDI research. Just recently, the White House staff has been considering early deployment of SDI and broad interpretation of the 1972 US-Soviet ABM treaty.

Given this condition, Gorbachev, who according to Henry Kissinger is a "skillful negotiator in arms bargaining with Washington," found a way to kill two birds with one stone—by singling out medium-range missiles from

the package. The Soviets can still maintain their objection to SDI while improving Soviet-US relations. If it is successful, it will create a favourable negotiating atmosphere and promote Gorbachev's chances to visit the United States. In his report to 27th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party last March, Gorbachev said he could not visit the US unless there were some concrete results in disarmament, at least an agreement on the halting of nuclear testing and the elimination of Euromissiles by the two sides.

US Pershing II and cruise missiles, though considered as medium-range missiles, can reach the heartland of the Soviet Union, while the Soviet SS-20 missiles are unable to penetrate US boundaries. If the two superpowers completely eliminated their medium-range missiles from Europe, it would remove a key component of US strategic military presence from the continent, while the Soviet Union's own security will remain ensured by a conventional force superior in strength. Moreover, removal of the US nuclear umbrella will weaken military relations between the US and Western Europe.

The Soviet disarmament pro-

posal comes at a time when US President Reagan is recovering from the domestic political turmoil and trying to regain the initiative of the executive branch. Because of this, it is difficult for Reagan to refuse to budge an inch in his stand on arms control. The Soviets are clearly aware of the political deadline for President Reagan set by 1988 presidential election. If a basic arms control agreement is not reached this year—early enough to give an impetus to a summit that could accomplish the final political breakthroughs that are needed—any attempted arms control deal would likely fall victim to presidential politicking.

Gorbachev has said that Washington is trying to debilitate the Soviets economically by forcing them into an arms race. To invigorate the Soviet economy, the Kremlin must cut military spending and contribute more to socialist construction. According to some Western analysts, a decrease in the growth of defence machinery output from Soviet's currently estimated level of 8.5 percent a year to 4 percent will let the Soviet economy achieve the growth levels envisaged under the five-year plan, even without major improvements in productivity.

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CSO: 5200/4063

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PEOPLE'S DAILY ANALYZES TESTS FACING INF TALKS

HK241355 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 21 Mar 87 p 6

["News analysis" by Zheng Yuanyuan (6774 0954 0954): "New Test Facing the Atlantic Alliance"]

[Text] The new Soviet proposal on reducing intermediate-range missiles has made possible some substantial breakthroughs in the U.S.-Soviet Geneva arms control talks. In recent days, the two sides have announced optimistically many times that they expect an agreement within 6 months. Thus, it will be possible that all intermediate-range missiles in Europe, including the 270 3-warhead Soviet SS-20 missiles deployed in the East European countries and the 316 single-warhead American Pershing-II and cruise missiles deployed in the 4 West European countries will be dismantled and removed.

These prospects will place a new question before the Atlantic Alliance concerning its international relations. Recently, the West European countries have been discussing this question, and they are conjecturing about the situation facing Western Europe once the United States and Soviet Union reach an agreement on intermediate-range missiles. Some people have expressed their worries about the prospects of U.S.-European relations. The West German newspaper in Cologne, KOELNER STADT-ANZEIGER said that if the European missiles are all removed, "the internal unity of the Atlantic Alliance may be harmed." The French newspaper LE MONDE said that "the Soviet proposal will pose a serious test to the Atlantic Alliance."

The new Soviet proposal is not different from the "zero option" put forth by NATO in November 1981, but they serve different purposes. In 1981, NATO had put its missile deployment plan into practice. At that time, the "zero option" was obviously directed at the Soviet Union. In the words of the Soviets, NATO tried to "exchange their missiles on paper for the Soviet Union's existing missiles." As the "zero option" was rejected by the Soviet Union, the NATO missiles were deployed according to the original plan. At that time, the "zero option" only mentioned the removal of the SS-20 missiles and did not mention short-range missiles and conventional armaments which represented the advantages of the Soviet Union. Now that the "zero option" will probably become reality, worries have been expressed in Western Europe about the issue of short-range missiles.

After the U.S. -Soviet summit last October in Reykjavik, the British press forecast: "The short-range missiles will gradually become a complicated problem in the disarmament dealings between East and West." According to the U.S. estimate, the Soviet Union has deployed some 650 short-range missiles, including SS-1, SS-21, SS-22, and the improved SS-23 missiles. Of these, the SS-22 missiles are a new type of highly accurate missile with an attacking range of some 900 km. However, the allies in Western Europe have only 261 short-range missiles, the number and attacking range of which cannot measure up to the Soviet missiles. Kennis Hunt, deputy director of the International Strategy Research Institute in London, recently pointed out in a speech that the great disparity in strength of short-range missiles will "naturally" cause Western European worry and apprehensions.

Although the United States and Soviet Union paid attention to the concerns of Western Europe in their recent talks and repeatedly expressed their willingness to hold negotiations on the issue of short-range missiles, this has not yet set the mind of Western Europe at rest. The British press held: "Because the arms talks are always without result for a long time, the Soviet advantages in regard to short-range missiles may become permanent advantages. [paragraph continues]

Western Europe is doubtful about whether the United States will give full consideration to Europe's interests in the talks in the coming months.

At the same time, the West European allies have also apprehensively noticed that like the Soviet Union, the United States is also anxious to reach an agreement on the issue of intermediate-range missiles. The U.S. Government is anxious to free itself from the predicament of "Irangate." On the other hand, it has focused the arms race with the Soviet Union on the field of space and strategic nuclear weapons, and the issue of the intermediate-range missiles is just a bargaining chip. Therefore, Western Europe is worried that if any decision is made hastily, the interests of Western Europe may not be taken into full consideration. Western Europe even doubts whether the United States will be patient enough to guarantee the security interests of Western Europe in the future complicated negotiations on short-range missiles and the reduction of conventional armaments.

All these worries and concerns come from the possible "divorce" in the defense affairs between the United States and Western Europe. One of the purposes of the 1979 decision to deploy intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe was to strengthen the U.S.-European defense links. If the missiles are removed, would this lead to the disintegration of U.S.-European defense links?

The talks on intermediate-range missiles have posed a new test of U.S.-European relations. But we should notice that the purpose of Western Europe's recent emphasis on such worries is to "sound the alarm" for the United States. Two sentences in the West European press can accurately reflect the feelings of the West European nations: We welcome the Soviet proposal, but this does not mean that we agree with it without reserve; our misgivings about the United States also does not mean that we are to create obstacles to the talks.

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CSO: 5200/4012

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRC FOREIGN MINISTER ON CHINESE DISARMAMENT MEASURES

OW250710 Beijing XINHUA in English 0647 GMT 25 Mar 87

[Text] Bonn, March 24 (XINHUA) — Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian said here Tuesday that it is an important part of China's foreign policy to "oppose the arms race and promote the realization of disarmament."

"China believes that all arms races, whether nuclear or conventional, on earth or in outer space, should be stopped," he told a meeting held by the Federal German Society on Foreign Policy.

Wu, who is also a state councillor, said he preferred to see medium-range nuclear missiles (INF) reduced step by step in both Europe and Asia, rather than eliminating them only in Europe.

He also said that to promote disarmament, China "has taken a series of disarmament measures in recent years, including cutting defense spending, transferring some of the military production to civil production...suspending nuclear tests in the atmosphere, and gradually reducing the Armed Forces by one million."

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CSO: 5200/4011

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRC FOREIGN MINISTER ON BALANCED REDUCTION

DW251141 Bonn DIE WELT in German 25 Mar 87 p 10

[Interview with PRC Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian by editors Herbert Kremp and Bernt Conrad; date and place not given]

[Excerpt] DIE WELT: The Americans and the Soviets are negotiating in Geneva on a European zero option regarding intermediate-range missiles. That solution envisages that 100 warheads will remain deployed in the Asian part of the Soviet Union. Is that solution acceptable to you, or would you prefer a global zero option fully eliminating Soviet warheads, including those in Asia?

Wu: Those are negotiations between the superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, on the reduction of intermediate-range missiles. We can only express our opinion. First, we take a positive attitude to every disarmament proposal -- regardless from which side it comes -- that will create detente in East-West relations, and that will safeguard peace in Europe and the world. As to the reduction of intermediate-range missiles, we have always been of the opinion that the European and Asian intermediate-range missiles must be reduced in parallel and in a balanced way, because security and peace in Asia, Europe, and the world are inseparable.

DIE WELT: If all intermediate-range missiles were eliminated in Europe, would they also have to be eliminated in Asia?

Wu: I have just discussed that.

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CSO: 5200/4010

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

NATO REJECTS SOVIET-PROPOSED AGREEMENT ON MBFR

AU051451 Paris AFP in English 1446 GMT 5 Mar 87

[Text] Vienna, March 5 (AFP) — NATO Thursday rejected a Soviet-proposed agreement aimed at breaking the 13 year-long stalemate in the East-West negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in central Europe.

Speaking here for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the head of the West German delegation, Guenter Joetze, said the proposed agreement was unacceptable due to its "extremely vague and imprecise" nature, particularly on the issue of verification measures.

The accord was proposed in December by the head of the Soviet delegation, Valerian Mikhaylov, who suggested a reduction in Europe of 6,500 U.S. troops and 11,500 Soviet ones. This was to be verified by "mutual observation".

"This vague process could lead to uncontrolled redeployment or replacement of the troops which had just been pulled out", stressed Mr. Joetze.

The verification issue is one of the main stumbling blocks at the MBFR talks.

NATO rejects Soviet demands that an agreement should include the right for the 500,000 Soviet troops which are replaced or rotated each year not to pass through control points manned by NATO personnel.

But the spokesman for the Soviet delegation, Nikolay Neiland, here said Thursday that the main obstacle to an early MBFR accord was "the West's lack of political will".

"An agreement on small-scale (troop) reductions would be an excellent prelude to future disarmament negotiations", he added.

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CSO: 5240/060

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: U.S. POSITION AT BILATERAL TESTING TALKS HIT

U.S. 'Not Opting for Accord'

LD202227 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 20 Mar 87

[Viktor Levin commentary]

[Text] Today the fourth round of the Soviet-American talks between experts on the question of halting nuclear tests ended in Geneva. Viktor Levin, our commentator is at the microphone.

[Levin] I would not like it at all if my prophesies come true, but I am afraid that quite a few rounds of talks will still be needed before the way opens up to full-scale talks on a complete nuclear test ban. I believe that such a way will open up, but I cannot venture to say when it will happen.

The present position of the U.S. representatives at the talks does not inspire optimism. This fourth round, too, has shown that the U.S. side is not opting for an accord on the beginning of talks. One could, perhaps, foresee such a result. The persistent, if not to say stubborn, U.S. unwillingness to renounce nuclear tests is unfortunately demonstrated not only by the fact that the U.S. representatives are trying to avoid resolving the question of full-scale talks, but also by the continuance of the nuclear tests program.

The position of Washington so far has not been influenced in practical terms either by our unilateral moratorium on conducting nuclear tests or by the readiness of the Soviet Union to immediately stop nuclear testing on a reciprocal basis, which we had to resume because of the actions on the part of the United States. Yet on no account would I call the talks in Geneva futile.

It is not only that an imperfect peace is better than a conflict, and that having talks is likewise better than not having them. In my view, day by day, it is becoming less possible for the United States to evade a solution to the questions about beginning full-scale talks on a complete nuclear test ban. Yes, the United States is ignoring the unilateral moratorium of the Soviet Union. It also ignored the moratorium on its nuclear testing grounds.

But the United States cannot wipe out the political influence of the Soviet moratorium, nor can it shun the influence that our position of readiness to compromise, in order to attain the beginning of full-scale talks on a complete test ban, is having on peoples' minds. Have we not suggested that a certain quota of tests be established if serious

talks begin? Since our approach to the problem of nuclear tests reflects our fundamental policy geared toward the consolidation of peace and ridding mankind of the threat of nuclear destruction, this policy is gaining increasingly wide support in the world.

So, it seems that the United States will hardly be able to endlessly avoid responding. This will not work. Life will force them.

Talks Lack 'Substance'

LD212159 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1732 GMT 21 Mar 87

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Andrey Ptashnikov]

[Text] [Ptashnikov] During the past week in Geneva the fourth round of Soviet-U.S. talks on halting and banning nuclear weapons tests was held. Our delegation was led by Petrosyants, chairman of the State Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy, and the U.S. delegation was led by U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Barker. What was the characteristic feature of the latest round of talks? I am putting this question to Vladimir Dmitriyev, our correspondent in Switzerland.

[Dmitriyev] First, one should note that the representatives of the two countries were working for only a few days, from 16 to 20 March. Thus the latest round only went on for a very modest and insignificant time.

[Ptashnikov] But how was it from the viewpoint of substance?

[Dmitriyev] In regard to substance no headway has yet been made at this stage. The instructions that the U.S. delegation travelled to Washington for and obtained do not allow the delegation to work toward an accord. Indeed, it cannot be ruled out that the U.S. representatives have been directly instructed to protract the talks. After all, the United States is continuing to bank on going on with its nuclear testing program and on further improving its armaments within the framework of the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative. As for the Soviet Union, our country, as well-known, did not conduct nuclear tests for more than 1 1/2 years following its declared moratorium. But Washington did not cease testing.

Returning to your question as to the substance of the talks, I would like to recall that during the fourth round the Soviet delegation tabled a draft joint document setting out a common understanding of the aims of the talks and the program for them.

Here is what Comrade Petrosyants says about this:

[Begin Petrosyants recording] We proposed that we reach agreement on the beginning of full-scale negotiations having as their end goal the total banning of nuclear tests. This is really the main aim of our talks, that is to say, our aim -- the aim of the Soviet side and the Soviet delegation. For these full-scale negotiations we put the following issues on the negotiating table: first ratification of the Soviet-U.S. treaties of 1974 and 1976, that is to say, the so-called threshold treaties; second, the introduction of interim limitations on the number and yield of nuclear explosions; third, the drafting of an accord on a total ban on nuclear tests; and finally, fourth, the monitoring of both the conducting and the halting of nuclear explosions and reliable implementation of the agreement.

However, what we have put on the negotiating table is not yet being met with understanding by the U.S. delegation. They are insisting on there being a discussion at the talks first of all on improving the monitoring of the threshold treaties of 1974 and 1976, and that alone. We think this is not right. The task of the Soviet delegation is to achieve its end goal of a total halt to nuclear weapons tests. We are not against discussing with the Americans issues that are of interest to them. But naturally, if talks are being held, they need to be held on a level that is of interest to both sides. [end recording]

Petrosyants Comments

LD231121 Moscow TASS in English 1056 GMT 23 Mar 87

[Text] Geneva March 23 TASS -- The leader of the Soviet delegation to Soviet-American expert talks on an end to nuclear testing today made a statement on the results of the latest round of these negotiations, which has ended here.

Andranik Petrosyants, chairman of the USSR State Committee for the use of Atomic Power, said in the statement:

The fourth round of Soviet-American expert talks for stopping nuclear tests ended in Geneva on March 20.

Summing up the results of the work done there, one has to say with regret that owing to the U.S. side's posture, it has not yet proved possible to make progress to the talks' objective of working out an accord to start full-scale negotiations that will lead to a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

The Soviet delegation continued to seek accord on the immediate beginning of such full-scale talks which would explore the entire range of issues related to the total termination of nuclear testing, including the ratification of the 1974 and 1976 Soviet-American treaties, interim limits on the number and yield of nuclear explosions, the formulation of an agreement on the total prohibition of nuclear tests, and verification of both the carrying out of nuclear explosions and their termination with a view to dependable compliance with agreements.

Such a broad approach will enable real progress towards the solution of such a problem of major importance not only to the USSR and the U.S. but to the whole of mankind as the total termination of nuclear tests.

But the American side is effectively trying to replace full-scale talks with a discussion of just one issue, that of monitoring compliance with the "threshold" treaties of 1974 and 1976. They have suggested that we limit ourselves to "upgrading" the verification arrangements for these treaties.

An examination of further intermediate restrictions on the number and yield of nuclear explosions, the more so a full ban on nuclear testing, is, in the meantime, being put off indefinitely and made conditional by the American side on the resolution of the first issue, and it is also being made dependent on a whole number of extra conditions, including a linkage with progress at other talks.

The American side thus is not demonstrating the political will needed to put an end to nuclear testing once and for all.

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CSO: 5200/1381

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: NUCLEAR TEST MONITORING EXPERIMENT CALLED SUCCESS

Monitoring Station 'Effective'

LD210052 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 20 Mar 87

[From the "Novosti newscast, V. Lyashko video report]

[Text] A joint Soviet-U.S experiment on monitoring [kontrol] the nonconduct of nuclear tests continues. The experiment is carried out within the framework of an agreement between the USSR Academy of Sciences and the U.S. National Resources Defense Council.

Three monitoring stations have been deployed [razvernuty] in Kazakhstan, in the region adjacent to the Soviet nuclear testing ground. Assembly of equipment in the specially drilled boreholes has now been completed here. This will make it possible to eliminate the influence of outside interference upon the results of seismic observations. A computer complex which provides the opportunity to analyze in an efficient way the incoming information, has been assembled at the base station. [video shows a long port-a-cabin, then two scientists working at computer terminals]

The main objective of the experiment is to work out a monitoring method for the nonconduct of nuclear tests. The results of Soviet and U.S. scientists' work in the Semipalatinsk region -- and they have been here for more than 6 months -- showed convincingly that effective monitoring methods do exist.

The agreement envisions deploying [razvernut] a similar network of stations in the proximity of the testing ground in Nevada. But for various reasons this has so far been delayed. Here in Kazakhstan, the work goes on in full accordance with the schedule of the experiment.

[D. Berger; identified by screen caption as a geophysicist from the University of California; in English fading to Russian translation] Together with the Soviet scientists we are working successfully on all aspects of the problem. The preparation of three seismic stations in Nevada and California is now being completed. We shall continue this experiment there.

U.S. Scientists Cited

PM231445 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 1

[S. Matayev reportage: "Experiment at the Test Site. Joint Work by Soviet and U.S. Scientists"]

[Text] Kazakh SSR -- The first phase of the Soviet-U.S. scientific experiment to monitor [kontrol] nuclear tests held in the Semipalatinsk region at the consent of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Natural Resources Defense Council is over. This is what the American scientists said about its preliminary results.

"First and foremost I must say that the Soviet side wholly fulfilled its commitment to conduct research in the area of nuclear test verification [kontrol] methodology," Professor Berger of the University of California, one of the leaders of the group of U.S. scientists, said. "Thanks to this, the first phase has ended more than successfully. Our ground apparatus was set up near the Soviet test site and observations and hundreds of different recordings were made."

The professor showed me the seismograms recorded by the U.S. equipment. For almost 8 months these sensitive instruments have recorded the echo of distant tremors and reverberations caused by nuclear explosions in Nevada, but not once in all this time did the automatic recorder register any soil tremors at Semipalatinsk. The Soviet moratorium, as is well known, lasted almost 19 months.

"The recordings we obtained," D. Berger continued, "convince us that international monitoring [kontrol] of tests of nuclear devices is possible and technically feasible. But the accuracy of the results will only increase if underground seismic equipment which completely rules out the effect of extraneous noise on the apparatus is installed. This work is included in the second phase of the experiment. It has started right on schedule. Wells 100 meters deep have been drilled to take our monitoring [kontrol] apparatus."

(Jacob Sherr) -- a participant in the international forum "For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity" -- joined in the conversation.

"Both in Moscow and here, near the Soviet test site, I have once again seen for myself the Soviet leadership's practical steps to keep the world safe from the nuclear threat. After thoroughly examining the seismic station, I have been struck by the work done. I think that there is a real basis for the research producing positive results in the sphere of mutual verification [kontrol]."

(Sherr) knows that it was not easy to ship the equipment for the second phase. Because of some error, if not deliberately, the cargo dispatched from the United States was lost by an international airline. With difficulty it was located in Tokyo and then forwarded to Moscow; from there a special flight took it to Karaganda. A trailer delivered the sensitive apparatus to Karkaralinsk where it got stuck in snowdrifts. But local people, miners vacationing at the "Shakhter" Vacation Center, came to the rescue.

"I was struck by Soviet people's unanimous interest in the holding of the joint experiment and their faith in us American scientists. Unfortunately, not everyone in my homeland knows about the experiment and not everyone realizes the attitude toward us here," (Sherr) said. "We have met with complete mutual understanding in the Soviet Union; we have been allowed to start work near the test site. Yet our Soviet colleagues have not received permission to set up their equipment on U.S. territory. We also regret that our country's administration failed to support the Soviet side's call for a moratorium on all nuclear tests. The tests in Nevada did not stop even during the 18 month silence at the Semipalatinsk test site. Yet we are convinced that our stay here will make some people look more soberly at the real state of affairs."

That is what (John Sharats), a leading specialist in the sphere of computer program development, said. He had come to the Soviet test site as a consultant for a major U.S. firm.

"My trip to Karkaralinsk was no accident, but there was a certain amount of luck associated with it. When I was invited to cooperate, I agreed straightaway. I had long been prepared for it — I have four children and am not indifferent to their future. Furthermore, I served during the Vietnam war."

"Were you a volunteer?"

"I didn't immediately realize what kind of war it was... I lost a leg there. But even if I'd lost both legs I would still have tried to be here today. There are not many places on earth where representatives of our powers have worked side by side and in agreement. Here, I am profoundly convinced, you can see for yourself for the umpteenth time that the talk about a 'Soviet threat' is utterly groundless and that your country and people really want peace and are persistently seeking ways of finding it."

As is well known, by mutual agreement the experiment is scheduled to take a year. It will end in July.

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CSO: 5200/1381

RELATED ISSUES

GROMYKO ADDRESSES CHILDRENS' PEACE GROUP 20 MAR

LD210314 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2015 GMT 20 Mar 87

[Speech by Andrey Gromyko, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, at 20 March meeting in Moscow with members of an international childrens' peace mission -- recorded]

[Text] With me here in the Presidium are Menteshashvili, secretary of the Supreme Soviet Presidium; Sergey Vladimirovich Mikhalkov, the outstanding Soviet writer, and a children's writer, too; and Genrykh Aviezerovich Borovik, another outstanding Soviet writer and journalist.

I would like to thank wholeheartedly all the young speakers who have each in their own way expressed the main idea and feeling by which people live today. Thanks to you all for these kind words. I shall say that such words, proceeding from adults and from politicians, too, are and always will be highly esteemed. What you have said, our dear young guests, is the truth. People want life; they want life, not death. And if one now asks the question, what now causes the greatest anxiety to people in the world, both adults and young people, schoolchildren, young people as a whole? They are worried about the destiny of peace.

Probably every young person, as soon as he starts to think, asks himself: What of tomorrow? Me, my family, those close to me, my friends, and my friends' friends, and mankind as a whole; how is mankind to live, or does some sort of catastrophe await it? That's a legitimate question.

Just decades ago, let's say half a century ago, this question and the answer to it had a different significance. There were wars, terrible, dreadful wars, which swallowed up millions and millions of human lives. But mankind has never experienced a war that was capable of bringing the calamities a nuclear war would lead to. It has now been accurately and scientifically proven that were this catastrophe to be unleashed, if nuclear weapons were set in motion, then life would disappear on earth. The earth would turn into something like a cemetery. This should indeed worry every thinking person -- old, young, or even very young. It must. Everybody must come together to ward off that catastrophe.

This, my dear young friends, is the main question confronting every person and mankind as a whole today. This is what I would like to say, and I hope you will take our answer away with you and tell everyone whom you meet. All Soviet people, everybody, wants only peace, only good relations. We want to live in peace with all countries, including the United States. There are young guests here who recently visited the United States. They met schoolchildren, children just like themselves. Once again,

they were convinced of the fact that Americans, the American people -- and we believe this -- also want peace, despise war, curse war. We believe in this desire of the American people. We consider that Americans and our people should stretch out their hands to one another; we are ready, and we are doing this. We are stretching out the hand of peace and friendship to all peoples, to the people of all countries -- Americans, and Britons, and the French, and West Germans, and Italians, and to all countries. We would like your trip to augment the number of people standing up for peace and against war; we want this number to grow. You will be in India; you will be in Japan. I hope you will agree to do this. Please convey the ideas of our Soviet people, of Soviet children and Soviet schoolchildren, students and the people as a whole: We want to live only in peace and friendship with all countries, including with India and Japan.

A second question arises -- this is a question that may arise in both young and very young little heads, and every adult will ask himself such a question: What can one do, what is the most reliable way to avoid this nuclear catastrophe I was speaking about, to avoid the cemetery, to ensure that life triumphs? The most reliable way -- I beg you to remember this -- is to destroy the terrible weapons that have been invented in the world, that is, nuclear weapons. Destroy them! [applause]

We Soviet people, the Soviet people, our leadership, headed by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, whom you have mentioned to us here, we insist upon this. Destroy nuclear weapons. And then, all people on earth can breathe freely.

We insist on such a policy of eliminating nuclear weapons. We also insist that people grant to those generations whose life will begin at the end of this century -- and there is not so much time left before the century expires -- conditions in which nuclear weapons will be absent. We consider that those generations, at the beginning of the new century, should be granted the dearest of all presents: a nuclear-free world. That would be the most invaluable present for everyone. We consider that at present all the efforts of those who determine the policy of states should be directed at destroying nuclear weapons and at making the world nuclear-free.

We might be told -- and indeed we are told -- that it is difficult to do all that at once. We are willing to concede that it is not easy, although given the desire and the resolve it is possible to do so. Mankind has created these weapons and mankind can destroy them as well. However, the task can be made easier by destroying the weapons in stages, by coming to an understanding and by signing corresponding agreements with those countries who possess nuclear weapons. This applies above all to the United States and the Soviet Union for understandable reasons. One could come to an understanding on the destruction of a part of the weapons by a specific date and it could even be stated in the agreement by what date. Then one could continue efforts to destroy the next part, and before the end of the century completely destroy these terrible weapons. If one were to express our policy briefly and in a concise and popular form, that is what it comes down to. I'm referring to foreign policy.

As for the domestic affairs of each state, let each state tackle its domestic affairs itself. We determine our domestic order and the Americans must determine their domestic order in which they want to live. This applies to other countries and other peoples, too.

That is what I wanted to say to you above all, because I sensed in your heads and hearts a great concern over the situation in the world and anxiety for the future. I hope that I have, at the same time, also answered the question posed by our guest from

India. I would like to add a few words though. As Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi during his visit to India, we also wish to maintain good and friendly relations with that great country. We profoundly respect the peace-loving actions of the people.

In conclusion, dear guests, I shall say that in our country we are constructing our peace policy as well, proceeding from the fact that there should be peace in the world. We are constructing our policy both in the development of the national economy -- in the economic sphere, as they say -- and with regard to various other kinds of problems usually known as social problem and other public problems by orienting ourselves toward peace and peace alone.

We are pursuing peaceful aims and nobody should entertain any thoughts about our peaceful construction causing harm to anyone. No, on the contrary. Everyone should be satisfied, because we will have more opportunities to trade, to establish business contacts with other states -- this will be good for both adults and youngsters and the younger generation -- to help one another, to exchange valuable material; in a word, to sustain an atmosphere and relations of peace, peace and only peace.

Do not tire, dear young friends -- and I address myself here to older friends, too -- do not tire of carrying out this noble work you are engaged in.

Each day lived through will multiply your strength, if this strength is directed toward preventing war and toward preserving peace; not only the Soviet people, but other peoples will applaud you for this activity. I wish you success in this noble work you are carrying out. You already know the way to the Soviet Union well, and if anyone, for example, loses their bearings a bit, just ask us, please, ask Madame Montandon (one of the childrens' chaperons), she'll help in that regard. We beg you to come to see us again. When you leave us, take with you our very best wishes. This concerns all of you. Thank you for the good words you have spoken; we esteem this highly, for truth itself was uttered by your lips. Good-bye.

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CSO: 5200/1379

RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S SHEVARDNADZE INTERVIEWED BY VIETNAMESE PAPER

BK240832 Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 15 Mar 87 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Comrade Shevardnadze, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and Soviet foreign minister on the occasion of his visit to the SRV by unidentified correspondent--date and place not given]

[Excerpts] Question: The world public can see clearly that at a time when the Soviet Union is tirelessly carrying out the struggle for peace and continuously putting forth many important peace initiatives, the Reagan administration is continuing to act in a way that runs counter to the aspirations of various nations. Would the comrade minister please express some views on the basic points of the present international situation?

Answer: You, comrade, are totally right when you say that actions by the Washington administration run counter to the aspirations of various nations, and I am pleased that your question puts the right emphasis on the present situation in the world.

In my opinion, the important thing in politics is to look beyond what is taking place at the present to discover developing trends and to judge which trends will have an increasing effect on the political system. In this respect, I think that the role of military strength in international relations is the most interesting issue.

Irreversible changes have taken place in the world. However, some politicians continue to live with old conceptions, including the conception of strength and arms as an omnipotent means to solve all problems, be they regional, geographical, or political problems. This fact -- which was argued by Comrade Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev at the recent Moscow forum for a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity -- has led to the realistic policies of many countries.

The effort to obstinately cling to strength and war adversely affects the internal situation of these countries as well as the international situation in general.

In every generation, politicians and state activists have to face the legacies left by their predecessors. There are legacies which many people, including ourselves, want to renounce but find it difficult to do so. However, it is necessary to renounce these legacies.

One major issue that involves us is nuclear weapons and our attitude toward these weapons. I suppose that it is the Washington administration which currently places boundless confidence in the invincible strength of weapons and the policy of using force.

Various modern technologies -- the crystallization of brilliant intellect and talent -- are being applied to the military production and have become a type of weapon that surpasses all types of weapons in the past.

All this is taking place under the influence of yesterday's political thinking: This thinking came into being from time immemorial, perhaps at the time when prehistoric man began to understand that strength and weapons could either protect him from another barbarian or ensure his victory. Afterward, this philosophy became the ideology of strong sociopolitical trends and systems.

Thus, since its birth, imperialism has relied on military strength and is inclined to use violent methods to protect and expand its political, ideological, and economic interests. Even now, imperialism is still attempting to act according to the motto: Might needs no mind. No. In today's political world, it is mind, reason, and talent that should have the upper hand in international affairs and should seek solutions to situations which some people wish to settle by means of military strength despite the fact that they have no hope for success.

In my opinion, it would be wrong to think that as long as imperialism still worships strength, nothing will ever change if imperialism continues to exist. However, the problem is this: first, the nature of the world itself has changed. Scores of independent and sovereign countries have become active and authoritative participants in the international dialogue that creates a new sociopolitical atmosphere. And the socialist world is having an ever greater influence on this atmosphere. It has rejected strength as a political mean and stand for disarmament. Second, with the appearance of nuclear weapons and missiles, an absolute obstacle has appeared for the first time in history on the road to using strength. This is because suicide cannot be a rational factor of politics. Third, the economic consequences of the arms race have strongly increased at an unacceptable rate.

To prove this point, we need only to consider what is happening to a strong economy, such as that of the United States. Washington's militarist policy coupled with the stockpiling of weapons advocated by President Reagan has caused extremely acute socioeconomic problems to the United States itself. Against this backdrop, even in the West, people have begun to ponder the consequences of the insane arms race. They have also come to understand that this race is threatening their own interests as well as their survival. As Comrade Gorbachev has emphasized, a new way of thinking has become a necessity. That is why the American side had to discuss with us the question of eliminating nuclear weapons. For the time being, the United States has not yet fully realized the importance of this issue because it still hopes to draw a trump card of strength through the Star Wars program. It would be hasty and baseless to say that imperialism will give up the arms race and renounce its reliance on strength.

But we also have sufficient confidence to judge the effort to narrow in an objective fashion and on an ever larger scale the limits of the use of strength and the policy of force. A world without nuclear weapons is a reality; a world without chemical weapons is also a reality; the gradual reduction of the level of military opposition on the worldwide, as well as regional scale, is also a reality. This is the basis for the conclusion drawn by Comrade Gorbachev in the political report he read at the 27th Congress of the CPSU that the only measure capable of ensuring a real and lasting security for all people is to build a comprehensive system of international security, that, to us, peace is a priority of the highest order, and peaceful coexistence among

countries is the general principle of relations among nations. And we are acting in line with these concepts — the concepts of a necessary formula for behavior in life in the era of a nuclear cosmos — in all directions, be they the direction of eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe or the direction of creating the premises for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Question: The statement of Comrade Gorbachev in Vladivostok and the New Delhi declaration were warmly welcomed and supported by world opinion, especially among the people in various Asia-Pacific countries. Would the Comrade Minister please comment on the prospects of the struggle for peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region?

Answer: Before coming to Hanoi, I went to Thailand, Australia, Indonesia, Laos, and Cambodia. In Bangkok, Canberra, and Jakarta we noted the great attention given to the views put forth by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in Vladivostok. As for our views, they are identical with those of our Lao and Cambodian friends. I can say that the willingness to give active support to the realization of the security doctrine in the Asia-Pacific region is based on awareness of political realities.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S PETROVSKIY INTERVIEWED ON WORLD SECURITY

AU171450 Sofia ZEMEDEL'SKO ZNAME in Bulgarian 8 Mar 87 pp 1, 4

[Interview With Vladimir Petrovskiy, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, in Moscow by Boris Chakurov, ZEMEDEL'SKO ZNAME correspondent -- date not given]

[Text] [Chakurov] Vladimir Fedorovich, 1 year has passed since the 27th CPSU Congress, which developed a new philosophical concept on the basis of which a specific political platform was worked out for a comprehensive system of international security. Would you please outline the specific steps for its implementation adopted by the USSR?

[Petrovskiy] First of all I would like to point out that the essence of the comprehensive system of international security is as follows: Today, the security of some states cannot be achieved to the disadvantage of other states. This system unites the main spheres of international security -- the military, political, economic, and humane spheres.

The USSR adopted large-scale and specific steps in all these areas. The starting point in the military-political sphere was the 15 January 1986 program on the liquidation of nuclear weapons until the year 2000. Even before it, the USSR appealed for the halt of all nuclear tests and repeatedly prolonged its unilateral moratorium. The concept of the Reykjavik meeting also belongs to the USSR. At the negotiating table in Reykjavik, the USSR proposed initiatives which, if the other side had positively responded, would have meant the end of the arms race and a crucial turning point toward disarmament and the removal of the nuclear threat.

The USSR's newest important step, the proposal to separate the issue of the nuclear medium-range missiles in Europe and to sign immediately a separate agreement on that issue, was also inspired by the goal of remove the nuclear threat.

Together with its allies from the Warsaw Pact, the USSR adopted bold and large-scale steps related to the issue of measures of confidence and the limiting of conventional weapons and armed troops in Europe. We expressed readiness to fully liquidate chemical weapons.

The USSR appealed to the countries of Asia and the Pacific to jointly strengthen security for each and every country in this huge region, and to develop equal and mutually beneficial cooperation. The signing of the Delhi Declaration became an event of great historical significance. This document unites our philosophical and political approaches toward constructing a state without nuclear weapons and oppression with the approaches of great India and the other states of the Movement of the Nonaligned Countries.

Everyone can see our new approaches toward the humanitarian problems incorporated in the "third basket" of the Helsinki Final Act. As Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev stressed in his speech at the international forum "For a Nuclear-Free World. For the Survival of Humanity", we are striving to translate our comprehensive philosophical view of the world to the language of practical policy and concrete acts.

[Chakurov] As deputy minister of foreign affairs you must deal a lot with the issues of creating a comprehensive system of international security. Would you share your impression of how this idea is greeted throughout the world?

[Petrovskiy] One can already draw some general conclusions about how the discussion of this issue with our opponents is proceeding, and what the position of this or that country, or the various blocs, is on this issue.

If one reviews the U.S. attitude toward this idea, one notices that certain circles, which influence the formation of their country's foreign policy course, oppose the participation of the United States in the discussions on the issues of creating a comprehensive system of international security. This is caused by the fear that such a system threatens their ideological and political postulates and undermines the foundations of the present American military and political doctrine. These, of course, are imaginary fears. The comprehensive system of international security threatens nobody. It is a matter of general interest.

One notices a multi-plan attitude in the approach of the NATO's European countries and the continent's neutral states toward the issue of creating a comprehensive system of international security. On the one hand, the basic postulates of our concept of a comprehensive system of international security are consonant in general lines with the ideas proposed by political figures in the West, representatives of scientific circles, and cultural figures, and represent an original and concentrated reincarnation of these ideas. It suffices to mention, for instance, the ideas proposed by the "Palme Commission," in whose work noted political and state figures from many countries actively participated. On the other hand, many of them, moving in the channels of the U.S. foreign policy principles, are not ready today to openly declare their interest in this idea and take an active part in the discussion of this issue on an international level. This could be seen at the recent voting at the United Nations on the relevant resolution, when the United States voted "against" it, while the other NATO states abstained.

There also are certain differences in the approach toward the issue of creating a comprehensive system of international security among the neutral and nonaligned countries. While some states, such as Austria and Finland actively participate in the dialogue on these issues, other states align with other positions.

[Chakurov] What basic argument is used against the Soviet initiative for a comprehensive system of international security?

[Petrovskiy] The negative argument has a purely formalistic character. Why must one talk about a comprehensive system of security when there is the UN Charter which contains a postulate on collective security? True, collective security is represented in the UN Charter, however, collective security and our proposal for a comprehensive system of security relate to each other, as the philosophers say, as a part to the whole. One must remember that historically the task of collective security, as we noted at the 27th CPSU Congress, is aimed against the general threat for entire mankind — the threat of self-destruction on the part of mankind.

Finally, collective security recognized the inevitability of military conflicts, and therefore stressed the issue of stopping an aggression.

The comprehensive system of international security, which we proposed, springs from the fact that conditions must be created which are to exclude both nuclear and conventional wars. Therefore, simultaneously with creating material and legal barriers, measures of prophylactic and preventive character also obtain a great significance.

A new and especially important element in the present postulate is the necessary creation of new foundations of international security in the humanitarian, economic, and other areas of international life, within the concept of creating a comprehensive system of international security.

In this context we can observe the classical example of the Western propaganda's double standard: When it considers it profitable, it raises the issue of an imperfection in the UN Charter, while now it tries also to juxtapose the Charter's postulates to the idea of creating a comprehensive system of international security.

[Chakurov] In the West they maintain that the war can be prevented only with great difficulty if the factor of "nuclear containment" disappears.

[Petrovskiy] From a theoretical point of view, one of the most interesting issues is the one on the system of guaranteeing security in the nuclear-free century. This issue now emerges in the foreground. What factor will the role of containment play under the conditions of a nuclear-free and violence-free world, as the Delhi Declaration states? If we are speaking in general terms, the creation of a comprehensive system of international security poses on the agenda the necessity of creating a system of political, material, and moral-psychological guarantees of preventing the war. In order to ensure the effective functioning of the system, it is necessary to first free ourselves from the lack of trust among the states and peoples. Trust must be created through the experience of cooperation, mutual acquaintance, and the solution of common issues. In principle, we cannot agree with those people in the West, who are trying to turn this issue upside down. You see, first of all we need trust, and then everything else — disarmament, cooperation, and joint projects. We must proceed toward trust and toward its creation, strengthening, and development through common deeds. We think that this is the most rational way.

In this context the issue emerges of the place and role of the international mechanisms as original regulators of the system of security.

[Chakurov] How would you review in more detail the concept of humanitarian security. What joint international actions are possible in this area?

[Petrovskiy] This concept emerged first during the all-European Helsinki process. The humanitarian area includes such issues as the unification of families, contacts among people, the creation of a new information order, and the struggle against terrorism. Until now these issues have been reviewed independently, as separate international issues. They were not included in the context of international security. However, one must see that international relations today are mortally influenced by the cult of power and the militarization of consciousness.

The issues of humanitarian character were reviewed at the 27th CPSU Congress as a component part of the comprehensive system of international security. In other words, in order to guarantee security and prevent wars, it is equally important to regulate the entire complex of humanitarian issues and the military-political issues as well. This can be facilitated to a large degree by the democratization of thought at the international level, equality, and the independent and active participation of all states -- big, small, and medium-size -- in the affairs of the international community.

The international public must also have its important say.

If international relations are to be "humanized," we need appropriate actions in the humanitarian area, more specifically, in everything related to information, contacts among people, creative exchange, and so forth. This will facilitate the creation of moral guarantees of protecting peace as well as material guarantees in this area.

It is no secret that the informational aggression, practiced by some countries, leads not only toward intellectual impoverishment, but also prevents the normal association of people from different countries and hinders the mutual enrichment of cultures. It evokes hatred and alienation among nations.

The USSR is open and ready to conduct a broad and overt exchange of opinions on the entire spectrum of issues of the comprehensive system of international security with all states, on the level of inter-state contacts and international forums with the participation of state and political figures, representatives of the international public and the business circles, who cherish the ideals of peace and mankind.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S PETROVSKIY ADDRESSES UN DISARMAMENT MEETING IN BEIJING

LD232028 Moscow TASS in English 1958 GMT 23 Mar 87

[Text] Beijing March 23 TASS -- TASS correspondent Grigoriy Arslanov reporting:

The 14th United Nations-Sponsored Regional Conference for the Asian and Pacific countries held within the framework of the world campaign for disarmament opened here today. It is discussing matters related to disarmament and international security.

The forum held in the capital of the People's Republic of China for the first time is attended by delegations from 16 countries of the Asian and Pacific region, including the Soviet Union and the United States.

During the five-day event the delegates will exchange views on disarmament and on ways for ensuring security, terminating the arms race and easing international tensions.

Speaking at the opening ceremony, Wan Li, a member of the political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, deputy premier of the State Council of the PRC, said that the escalation of the arms race and its spread to outer space were devouring huge resources and seriously threatening international peace and security.

Addressing the conference, Vladimir Petrovskiy, a deputy minister of foreign affairs of the U.S.S.R., said: Reykjavik has convinced us all the more that in a military and space era security should be ensured by political, not military or technical, means. The Soviet proposal on medium-range missiles is a step of exceptional importance designed to lower the level of military confrontation both in Europe and in Asia.

Strongly advocating the abolition of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union has set forth a program for conventional arms reduction, for finding a balance at the level of reasonable sufficiency.

Touching on the Asian aspect of disarmament process, the Soviet representative pointed to certain facts which served as a source of extreme concern to international public opinion -- the buildup of U.S. nuclear arsenals in the region, plans for the establishment of the Washington-Tokyo-Seoul triangle, the turning of Micronesia into a major U.S. strategic base and attempts at developing nuclear weapons by joint efforts in the Tel Aviv-Pretoria-Taipei triangle.

Proposals put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in his speech in Vladivostok, the deputy minister said, open the road to a system of dependable security in Asia by providing a wide set of measures to limit and reduce armaments and build up trust in that vast region.

RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET WRITER QUESTIONS NUCLEAR RETALIATION

PM111527 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 10, 19 Mar 87 p 7

[Article by Ales Adamovich under the rubric "'MN' [MOSCOW NEWS] Discussion Club": "At the Forum and After"]

[Excerpt] If the question "whose side are you on?" had been put to those at the Moscow International Forum, the answer would have been "on the side of humanity." "What do you oppose?" "We oppose the Bomb". They would have upheld general human values. In the face of global problems and perils, the prevailing atmosphere was that of mutual respect and self-respect, and it would have been a torture for use there to hear speeches and arguments regarded customary only yesterday.

As we were starting a round-table discussion on the new mode of thinking, a West European participant got up, visibly nervous, and suggested that a human rights committee be formed before the Forum got underway. I don't know which reaction he had expected, but Aytmatov and Klimov who were presiding swiftly responded by saying: "OK, could you take the trouble to make up such a committee, work out proposals and bring them to the meeting's notice?" "Me?" "Yes, that's right?"

Finally it was recognized that all of us have problems in this field and that we have at least been solving our own problems by moving towards a comprehensive democratization of society not just by talking about human rights in inverted commas and call them "so-called" as journalists did rather foolishly in the past. It's only proper that human rights should exist, be expanded and protected.

The new mode of thinking is not simply new logic. It is new morals, new perception and new literature. This is what I was eager to discuss thoroughly at the Forum and would like to discuss here in this article.

The new mode of thinking can be fearful. It's no simple thing to ponder over things suggested by the age of nuclear weapons.

I once happened to talk with a commander of a modern submarine.

"It must make you somewhat uneasy to know what cosmic might you can wield."

He said: "If such a thing exists, someone has to control it. You've only got to keep back unnecessary thoughts."

"But let's imagine," I hurried on to find out all at once, "that those whose doctrine regards the first strike conceivable have done just that. Or there is an accident, an error and half the world goes up in flames, would you respond or not?"

The women at the table responded right away:

"You would, of course. Look, they didn't spare us!"

These hurried voices came from the past war, the prenuclear one.

The submarine commander was silent. Then he asked me:

"Would you press the button?"

"No, I wouldn't." The destroyers of humankind would then have finished it off using my retaliatory strike.

I also said upon reflection that retribution would surely catch up with them without a retaliatory strike in the shape of the deadly radiation from their own warheads and the bombed nuclear reactors.

"I have no comment," said the naval officer. "No one, especially they, should know what I'd do."

No, we don't want any part in murdering humankind. We refuse to deliver either the first or the second strike, or any other because we are for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. We are ready to gladly part with nuclear "might", we aren't happy in the least about the cancerous pseudo-biceps, we are not holding on to the status of a nuclear power -- all of our proposals, moratoriums, our practical steps to meet the other side halfway tell their own story.

Surely, the new mode of thinking does not consist of mental exercise. It takes courage.

It takes courage for a military man to admit the insanity, absurdity and brutality of the very "business" of war, to run down as it were their profession. For me there are no military [men] more courageous and worthier than those who, like many retired generals, give their military expertise to the antiwar movement. [passage omitted]

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET-U.S. CONFERENCE ON NUCLEAR THINKING ENDS

LD192138 Moscow TASS in English 1950 GMT 19 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 19 TASS -- The Soviet-U.S. conference "New Mode of Thinking in the Nuclear Age: Social Inventions for the Third Millenium" ended here today. It was sponsored by the Soviet Peace Committee jointly with the U.S. Center for the U.S.-American Dialogue [as received] public organisation which unites scientists, businessmen and cultural personalities seeking to develop good relations and cooperation with the USSR.

The working groups on problems of global politics and security, on education, ethics and world outlook, on issues of psychology and public health service, on communication and mutual understanding and also on forms of mutual cooperation have drawn up a whole range of varied projects.

Among them is broadcasting concerts via television hookups, carrying out joint publishing activity, introducing new types of childrens' games, and conducting surveys of public opinion in peace and security issues.

The conference stressed that the joint work which was launched at it became a specific contribution to translating into action the initiatives of the international Moscow forum "For a Non-Nuclear World, for the Survival of Humanity".

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RELATED ISSUES

IZVESTIYA INTERVIEWS MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTER

PM241043 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with Mexican Foreign Minister Bernardo Sepulveda Amor by special correspondents L. Korneshov and S. Mikoyan in Mexico City: "Sepulveda Amor: Strengthening Mutual Trust" -- date not given; first paragraph is unattributed introduction]

[Text] The USSR and the United States of Mexico are linked by traditionally friendly relations. Mexico makes its contribution to the quest for peaceful ways to resolve the Central American conflict which echoes far beyond the region's borders, and to the strengthening of the climate of trust between peoples. This was the topic of conversation between our special correspondents and the country's Foreign Minister Bernardo Sepulveda Amor.

Mexico City -- [Correspondent] Mr Minister, the participants in the international forum "For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity," which recently ended its work in Moscow, firmly advocated elimination of the gap between political practices and pan-human moral and ethical norms, and the affirmation of new political thinking. What, in your view, ought to be undertaken today to strengthen trust between countries and peoples, to cast off the burden of confusion and prejudice, and to think and act in a new fashion?

[Sepulveda] First of all, I would like to emphasize the importance of dialogue and talks. Of course, I am aware that these two terms -- dialogue and talks -- also presuppose a certain machinery, some instruments for their practical implementation.

Let us recall the Helsinki conference: Soem very important conclusions regarding the strengthening of mutual trust stem from its decisions. There is no doubt that the Helsinki conference itself, and the very fact that it was convened, engendered a climate of mutual trust and that, within the framework of the decisions it adopted, measures were taken which helped to strengthen an atmosphere favoring talks and dialogue. The Helsinki conference became such an important instrument serving the strengthening of trust.

New efforts are necessary in the cause of establishing nuclear arms control. This applies basically to USSR-U.S. dialogue and talks, since it is these two powers that possess the largest nuclear arsenals. In this respect, for example, the holding of summit meetings between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan could, in our view, provide a most important foundation for dialogue and talks on the reduction and control of nuclear arms. This should not be limited only to measures on establishing mutual trust in the sphere of European security or nuclear arms.

In the sphere of North-South relations, of relations between industrially developed and developing countries, there is a need to elaborate a plan for a restructuring of international economic relations leading to a redistribution of wealth in the world.

These are the three spheres of international activity in which, in my view, it is exceptionally necessary to implement special measures to strengthen trust between peoples and countries.

[Correspondent] As you know, people in our country highly appraise the efforts by the "Delhi Six," in which Mexico plays such an eminent role. Can mankind hope that, as a result of efforts by countries great and small, by all states, it will enter the third millennium having left the shadow of nuclear threat behind?

[Sepulveda] First of all, I must note that this is a problem of survival for us all, and hence we must unwaveringly pursue a world free of the nuclear threat. Regarding Mexico, we have long insisted that steady progress toward universal nuclear disarmament is needed to achieve security for ourselves and international security in general. We are aware that stages of movement are necessary along this path, as well as reliable monitoring of nuclear arms reductions.

I would also like to emphasize that, regarding Mexico and Latin America as a whole, an entire region free of nuclear weapons has been formed here thanks to the Tlatelolco Treaty. We hope that similar nuclear-free zones will appear in different parts of the world. We are also gratified by the fact that a nuclear-free zone including Australia and New Zealand is being formed in the South Pacific. This will undoubtedly help to strengthen the atmosphere of peace and security throughout the region defined by the treaty.

I am aware that proposals are also being made in Europe to establish a nuclear-free "corridor," which would be a contribution to the cause of creating a system of peace and security.

We also hope that USSR-U.S. bilateral talks will soon lead to political mutual understanding and create an opportunity to reduce the nuclear arsenal and the number of ICBM's, medium-range missiles, and everything else related to it, including submarines and bombers.

I believe success in these talks would benefit the entire system of international relations: USSR-U.S. political agreement on nuclear arms would revive the climate of detente in international relations. It would also facilitate the solution of political problems like regional conflicts and lead to a revival of international economic cooperation.

[Correspondent] The struggle to prevent bloodshed and strengthen peace is encountering serious difficulties. This is easily perceptible in the example of the Contadora Group. Meanwhile, in our view, it is apparent there can be no other way to solve the conflicts in Central America in the foreseeable future than the one proposed by this group. Are you hoping this truth will be ultimately understood by all sides involved in the conflict?

[Sepulveda] It seems that here, just as in the previous question, we are talking about hopes. The activity of the "Delhi Six," just like the work of the Contadora Group, was based on the impassioned hope that the goals and tasks set by both the "Delhi Six" and the Contadora Group would soon bear fruit. [paragraph continues]

We did not ignore the difficulties which they soon encountered. They only confirmed my confidence that the solutions proposed by us accord most fully with the regional interests and the national interests of every state and every side involved in the Central American conflict.

We believe adoption of the Contadora Group's recommendations would lead to the establishment of a system of peace, security, and real democracy throughout the Central American region. This would be most obviously beneficial to countries and peoples in the region and to the countries neighboring the region.

[Correspondent] Could it be said the recent tour by the eight ministers together with the UN and OAS secretaries general signified a new stage in the Contadora Group's activity?

[Sepulveda] It is perfectly obvious that this tour testifies to the recognition of the Contadora proposals made 4 years ago. At that time, there were only four Latin American governments of a democratic orientation convinced that peace in Central America could be achieved only along the path of political dialogue. Our diplomatic activity was given a major fillip by the support of a further four Latin American countries concerned with the fate of democracy in the Latin American countries concerned with the fate of democracy in the Latin American region and convinced of the viability of the solutions proposed by the Contadora Group. This was augmented by the efforts and support of UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar and OAS Secretary General Baena Soares and their acceptance of our invitation, whose purpose was to enable them, in the course of direct dialogue with the leaders of Central American countries, to check for themselves the effectiveness of proposals by the Contadora Group and the Support Group and to find forms within which these two international organizations -- one universal and the other regional -- could elaborate machineries helping to achieve political agreements between Central American governments.

At the same time, the participation of the two secretaries general boosted the Contadora Group's prestige to the highest political level and provided an incentive for the activity of the Contadora Group and the Support Group, whose member countries represent 90 percent of Latin America's population.

[Correspondent] What, in your opinion, are the characteristics of contemporary Soviet-Mexican relations, and what are the prospects for their development in the immediate future?

[Sepulveda] Recently, in October 1986, we had the pleasure of welcoming USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze. I had an opportunity to meet him back in 1985 at the United Nations. That was our first meeting. I must note that we established an atmosphere of open and frank exchange of opinions, and this will undoubtedly help the elaboration of projects and programs in the most diverse spheres and the strengthening of friendship between the Soviet and Mexican peoples.

[Correspondent] We have learned that you are planning to visit the Soviet Union. What do you expect from this visit?

[Sepulveda] It is part of a broader program. You know, of course, that our republic's President De la Madrid invited M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to visit Mexico. In the course of our conversation with Minister Shevardnadze, he invited me to visit the Soviet Union. Now we are in the process of agreeing on possible dates, and I think we will manage to set the date for this visit soon and, on that basis, continue the talks with my colleague Shevardnadze which began so successfully last October.

RELATED ISSUES

TASS CITES REPORT ON U.S. NEUTRON SHELLS IN ISRAEL

PM241205 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Mar 87 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Neutron Bomb for Israel"]

[Text] Cairo, 23 Mar -- The United States has stockpiled neutron charges in Israel and consented to their use in the event of an outbreak of war, the Egyptian newspaper AL-WAFD writes. The newspaper has learned that, in accordance with the agreement on strategic cooperation with Tel Aviv signed in 1983, 1,000 of these shells have been transferred to Israel. And the Israeli authorities have now received the right to use these shells "in the event of war." [paragraph continues]

Thus, having concentrated neutron warheads in Israel, the newspaper emphasizes, Washington has in fact placed them at the disposal of the U.S. "Rapid Deployment Force" and intends to use these weapons itself in the region or to enable Tel Aviv to do so.

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RELATED ISSUES

PRC VICE-FOREIGN MINISTER OUTLINES CHINA'S DISARMAMENT STAND

OW231619 Beijing XINHUA in English 1602 GMT 23 Mar 87

[Text] Beijing, March 23 (XINHUA) — China's vice-foreign minister, Qian Qichen, said here today that China has consistently opposed the arms race, will never participate in it and supports all actions and initiatives that are conducive to the realization of disarmament and the elimination of the threat of nuclear war.

Qian made this remark as a guest speaker at the regional Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign here this afternoon.

He said, "We are of the view that the two superpowers should take the lead in halting immediately the testing, production and deployment of all nuclear weapons. They should also drastically reduce and destroy all nuclear weapons they have deployed anywhere inside and outside their countries so as to create conditions for other nuclear states to take part in nuclear disarmament."

He pointed out that in recent year, the Soviet Union and the United States, while stating that a nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought, have both put forth a number of proposals and plans for disarmament, one of which is a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons as the first step.

However, he said, the Soviet Union and the United States have so far reached no substantive agreement, and their basic differences remain as serious as ever.

Of late, he pointed out, the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on intermediate-range missiles and their related proposals have attracted much attention. The vice-minister added that the question of the intermediate-range missiles has a direct bearing on the security of countries in Europe as well as in Asia.

He said, international security is indivisible. The security of Europe is important and the security of Asia is equally important.

He said that China insists, in accordance with the same principle, there should be a simultaneous and balanced reduction of intermediate-range missiles deployed in both Europe and Asia until they are completely destroyed.

He said that China unequivocally supports the proposals for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in Latin America, the South Pacific, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean peninsula.

Like many other countries, he said, China is for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and China's nuclear cooperation with other countries is confined only to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Qian said that while emphasizing nuclear disarmament, one should not overlook the importance and urgency of conventional disarmament. And there is in fact a link between nuclear and conventional disarmament.

He said that mankind is faced with the threat of a nuclear war and is haunted by a specter from outer space. Nuclear arms in space, he said, is an extension and development of the nuclear arms race that will lead to a more complex situation characterized by a progressive escalation of the arms race involving offensive nuclear weapons and defensive weapon systems. This race will further destabilize the world and increase the danger of war. To check this race has become the most urgent task of mankind, he said.

He said, outer space is the common heritage of mankind, and its development and utilization should bring benefits to mankind. It is against the will of mankind for any country to develop, test, produce or deploy outer space weapons in any way, he said. He said it is hoped that an international convention on the complete prohibition of outer space weapons can be concluded at an early date.

Qian said, while disarmament contributes to peace and security, disarmament alone is not enough to preserve peace and security.

He said that world peace and national security are closely interrelated. Encroaching upon a nation's independence and sovereignty will undoubtedly jeopardize world peace.

Therefore, he said, in order to safeguard peace and security it is essential to oppose any form of interference by one country in the internal affairs of others and any form of violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of others, and to oppose any country's use of military means to subject others to a war of aggression.

Also speaking at this afternoon's conference as guest speakers were Major Britt Theorin, chairman of the Swedish Disarmament Commission of the Foreign Ministry, Vladimir Petrouskiy, deputy foreign minister of the U.S.S.R., and Lynn Hansen, the acting representative to the conference on disarmament.

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RELATED ISSUES

PRC STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF DISARMAMENT AT SYMPOSIUM

Commentary Stresses Peace

OW240801 Beijing in Russian to the USSR 1800 GMT 23 Mar 87

[Station commentary: "In Search of Paths to Disarmament and Defense of Peace Throughout the World"]

[Text] A regional UN symposium on questions of the international disarmament campaign opened in Beijing on 23 March. Several dozen officials, well-known figures, experts, and scientists from more than 10 countries of the Asia-Pacific region, Europe, and America will discuss the most important problems closely linked to the fate of the people of the whole world, such as the question of realizing disarmament and defending peace and security.

This is undoubtedly an event of far-reaching significance. China has always actively supported all efforts of the United Nations and the international community aimed at defending peace in the world and realizing disarmament. On this occasion the Chinese people are glad that their country is the organizer of the regional symposium on questions of the international disarmament campaign. They sincerely hope that the efforts of the symposium will promote the struggle of the world's people to ease international tension and defend peace and security. We are confident that this is also the common aspiration of friends in various countries.

For many years the problem of realizing genuine disarmament and finding effective ways to achieve it has been on the agenda. At present increasingly more countries and officials have come to realize that particular responsibility for disarmament lies with the superpowers. This has been confirmed by the UN General Assembly and has been set down in its resolutions. China's position in this regard is precise. As far as nuclear disarmament is concerned, it is China's opinion that the two superpowers, which have more than 97 percent of the world's nuclear arsenal at their disposal, must be the first to undertake actions for an immediate end to testing, manufacturing, and deploying any kind of nuclear weapons, and must reduce and destroy, on a large scale, nuclear weapons of various kinds deployed in their own country or abroad, thereby creating conditions for the participation of other states in nuclear disarmament.

Presently the peoples of the world are attaching great attention to the proposals of the Soviet Union and the United States on eliminating intermediate-range missiles in Europe and to talks between them on this question. China holds that international security is indivisible. Security in Europe is as equally important as in Asia. The

intermediate-range missiles deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe and Asia should be reduced according to the same principle, in a synchronized and equal way, right up to their complete elimination.

As one of the nuclear powers, China understands its responsibility full well. As early as 1964 China had stated unambiguously that China would under no circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons. China also pledged never to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries or to threaten them with using nuclear weapons. China has signed protocols to the treaty on turning Latin America into a nuclear-free zone and the treaty on turning the southern Pacific Ocean into a nuclear-free zone. For many years China has not conducted a nuclear test. Last year China announced that it will not conduct any more atmospheric nuclear tests. China does not favor nuclear proliferation, does not promote it, and does not help other countries in the development of nuclear weapons.

In addition, China has come out for a complete ban on space, bacteriological, and chemical weapons and for a radical reduction of conventional arms. At the same time China has undertaken measures on its own initiative to reduce military spending, and is successfully implementing a plan to reduce the number of personnel in the PLA by 1 million men. All these steps most clearly demonstrate China's sincere desire for disarmament.

To promote the realization of disarmament and defend peace and security — this is the common responsibility of the world's people. At the symposium, officials, experts, and scientists of various countries will also make proposals and express their opinions on disarmament to enable the adoption of positive things from one another. China is ready to support any initiative or proposal that promotes the realization of disarmament and averts the threat of war. Disarmament, in our opinion, will serve the cause of peace and security, but peace and security are not realized solely through disarmament. The security of various countries and peace throughout the world will be reliably safeguarded only if all countries, both large and small, guided by the spirit of the UN Charter, enjoy equal sovereign rights and come out against expansion, interference, and aggression in all its forms.

We wish the symposium every success.

Huan Xiang Speaks

OW241708 Beijing XINHUA in English 1645 GMT 24 Mar 87

["World Must Carry Out Disarmament for Existence and Development of Mankind, Says Huan Xiang" — XINHUA headline]

[Text[Beijing, March 24 (XINHUA) — Huan Xiang, director-general of the Center for International Studies in China, said here today that the world must disarm for the sake of human existence and development of mankind.

Huan, whose center is under the State Council, made the remark in a speech to the Regional Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign.

He said that in 1986, which is the International Year of Peace, about one fifth of the world's population is too poor to afford proper housing yet some one trillion U.S. dollars were spent on war or war preparations, which is 11.1 percent more than that of the year before last.

Huan said it is estimated that there are more than fifty armed conflicts and wars going on which involve a quarter of the countries in the world, causing tremendous loss of life and property.

He said in the past 15 years the worldwide expenditure on arms has doubled, and the increasing speed of growth rate has surpassed that of the world's economy. No country can bear the burden of arms expenditure, he added.

The United States and the Soviet Union are the two strongest powers. Their military expenditure was 60 percent of the total of all other countries. The arms race between these two powers has worsened not only the world situation but also their own economies, he said.

He said that developing countries, which comprise 75 percent of the world's population, produce only 21 percent of the world gross product value. They are already overburdened by economic problems, and yet have used a large proportion of their national income for armament, he added.

Huan called on the international community to take practical steps to promote disarmament and proposed the following steps.

First, both the United States and the Soviet Union, which possess the biggest arsenals of nuclear and conventional weapons, should reduce the numbers of their weapons, and neither of them should escalate the arms race into outer space in order to gain military superiority.

Second, both superpowers should not make new military alliances or arrangements in other regions, interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, nor create or sharpen disputes and conflicts among Third World countries. If the superpowers refrained from these things they would create conditions in developing countries to greatly lessen their arms burden.

Third, it is necessary to create a good international atmosphere for disarmament.

Fourth, China has repeatedly laid emphasis on mutual dependence among nations. To achieve the aims of development, China must seek proper and beneficial cooperative relations and economic channels.

Fifth, every nation should be allowed to make independent choices for its development strategy and no state has any right to force its will upon others. Neither should they expand their sphere of influence on the pretext of assisting others to develop.

Lastly, all statesmen and people with foresight and sagacity must think in new ways. Politics and ideology should meet the aims of benefitting mankind and the needs of economic development. The world will get nowhere in this nuclear era if countries continue to solve political disputes by overthrowing a political ideology or social system by force.

At the end of his speech he pointed out, "we must take the initiative in disarming to ensure the economic development of the world. The Chinese people have clearly recognized through historic experience that a peaceful environment is necessary for our national prosperity and development. That is why we have taken the important measure of demobilizing one million soldiers. We have ended all atmospheric nuclear experiments, and we have shifted a large number of war related industries to civilian production. These are all practical steps that we have taken. We are expecting other countries, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, to take substantial steps in the direction of disarmament in order to promote world development.

At this morning's conference, guest speakers from Australia, India, and Pakistan recalled the measures taken by the United Nations on disarmament since the Second World War. They also made a lot of suggestions for disarmament and explored the issue of establishing bilateral or even multilateral negotiation.

Guest speakers from Canada, India and Mongolia expressed their views on disarmament and development at this afternoon's conference. They all think that disarmament is conducive to the development of mankind and hoped to make efforts for the realization of world peace.

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RELATED ISSUES

PRC VICE-PREMIER ADDRESSES BEIJING DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

OW230852 Beijing XINHUA in English 0836 GMT 23 Mar 87

[Text] Beijing, March 23 (XINHUA) -- More than 30 officials, experts and well-known figures from different Asian and Pacific countries gathered here today for a conference to seek ways to halt the arms race and ease world tension.

The Regional Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign, initiated in 1982, is sponsored by the United Nations (U.N.).

"To actively promote the process of disarmament and to realize a genuine disarmament have become ardent demands of the people of various countries and an important task of great urgency entrusted to our generation by history," Chinese Vice-premier Wan Li told the conference.

At present, he said, there has been no genuine relaxation of the international situation, and the danger of war still exists. The further escalation of the arms race and its extension into outer space have not only usurped enormous human resources, but also gravely threatened world peace and security, he said.

The Chinese vice-premier reaffirmed the relevant U.N. resolutions, which stipulate that countries possessing the largest nuclear and conventional arsenals have a special responsibility for halting the arms race and for disarmament. The international community calls upon them to take the lead in drastically reducing their armaments so as to create conditions for general disarmament, he said.

At present, developments in the U.S.-Soviet disarmament negotiations have attracted widespread attention among the international community.

"We are of the view that dialogue is better than confrontation, and relaxation is better than tension," he said, adding, "we sincerely hope that these countries will conduct negotiations in earnest and reach an early agreement on disarmament conducive to the relaxation of tension without jeopardizing the interests of other countries."

Wan Li said that China declared to the world on the very first day it came into possession of nuclear weapons that at no time and under no circumstances would China be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Last year China also declared that it would conduct no more atmospheric nuclear tests. China has signed the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the relevant additional protocols to the South Pacific nuclear free zone treaty.

And the plan to reduce China's military forces by one million men is being implemented smoothly. "These actions China has taken fully reflect the country's sincerity about disarmament," he said.

Yasushi Akashi, undersecretary-general of the U.N. Department for Disarmament Affairs, spoke highly of China's efforts in promoting international peace and security.

He said that China has given staunch support to the U.N. in its efforts to curb the arms race and achieve disarmament. It has also put forward a number of valuable proposals which have prominently figured on the agenda of various disarmament forums, he said.

"In view of the ultimate threat which the arms race represents for mankind, there is no other alternative for us but to pursue disarmament resolutely. The U.N. has a moral duty and a political responsibility to ensure the survival of mankind.

"It must be recognized that each nation, large or small, has vital security concerns rooted in its history, geographical location and global outlook, and each has a legitimate right to its national security," he said.

Zhou Peiyuan, president of the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament, extended a warm welcome to the conference delegates on behalf of his association, which is a nongovernmental peace organization composed of 21 people's organizations in China.

"I have led a fairly long life of 85 years, enough to experience both the misery caused by war in the old days and the happiness of the tranquillity today," he said. "Enjoying times of peace has been the ideal and the long-cherished wish of the Chinese people for thousands of years. Like all other ordinary people, I know only too well how precious peace is. Peace is both the inevitable trend of the times and the wise choice of man," Zhou said.

"We believe that all countries, big or small, should have a say on the issue of disarmament and the efforts for disarmament should be combined with those for safeguarding international security," he said.

He reaffirmed China's aspiration to halt the arms race, to stop the expansion of the arms race into outer space and the sea, and to make science and technology "solely serve peace and benefit mankind."

Attending today's opening ceremony were also guest speakers and celebrated personages from Canada, Sweden, the United States and the Soviet Union.

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RELATED ISSUES

XINHUA COMMENTARY ON ARMS RACE, UN CONFERENCE

OW212155 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 1310 GMT 21 Mar 87

[Text] Beijing, 21 Mar (XINHUA) -- Commentary: "Arms Race Threatens Peace, Hinders Development" by XINHUA reporters Mei Zhenmin and Xiong Changyi.

The 14th "United Nations Regional Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign" will soon be held in Beijing from 23 to 27 March. Thirty unofficial representatives from 16 countries in the Asian-Pacific Region, 10 specially invited diplomats, and many observers will gather here to exchange their views on disarmament and security issues and explore ways to stop the arms race and relax the tense situation.

The reason the world community is so concerned over the disarmament issue is that the increasingly aggravated arms race by the superpowers has severely threatened world peace and hindered world development.

The Soviet-U.S. nuclear arms race has reached the point where their nuclear arsenals possess "super-killing capabilities" that threaten the existence of mankind. Right now, there are at least 50,000 nuclear warheads in the world. Their total explosive force is equivalent to 13 billion tons of high explosive. On the average, that makes about 3 tons of these explosives in the form of nuclear warheads for each person in the world. The overwhelming majority of these nuclear warheads belong to the United States and the Soviet Union. The nuclear warheads possessed by these two countries account for more than 97 percent of the total number of nuclear warheads in the world. According to a research report carried in the 1984 winter issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS in the United States, if 1,000 nuclear bombs were dropped in a nuclear war with a total explosive force equivalent to 100 million tons of explosive, they would create a nuclear catastrophe affecting the whole world and destroying human civilization. A UN expert estimated that an all-out nuclear war could possibly kill 4 billion people. Some scientists hold that nuclear warfare could create a bitter "nuclear winter" and destroy mankind's environment after a certain period of time. Right now, there is a new quantitative escalation in the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. They are vying with each other in developing space weapons and expanding their arms race to outer space.

The superpower arms race has poisoned the international atmosphere and aggravated regional conflicts. According to the UN statistics, more than 150 regional wars and armed clashes with conventional weapons took place in the world in the 40 years between 1945 and 1984, killing more than 20 million people. Right now, there are nearly 50 regional wars and armed clashes going on, affecting approximately one quarter of the countries in the world. Although the reasons for these regional clashes and wars are complex and

abundant, many of the clashes and wars are either directly or indirectly connected with U.S. or Soviet meddling. The conventional arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States has increased the intensity and destructive power of these regional wars and clashes. Many regional wars that broke out in the Third World have become the proving ground for modern conventional weapons.

The Soviet-U.S. arms race has brought about rapid and sharp increases in military spending, drained a large amount of mankind's wealth, and hindered regular social, economic, and cultural developments in the world. According to statistics compiled by the U.S. Institute for World Observation and Research, worldwide military spending was \$400 billion in 1960. It rose sharply to \$940 billion in 1985. Last year, the world GNP was \$16 trillion, but military spending was as high as \$1 trillion. This military spending exceeds the total income of all the poor people in the world, who account for half of the world's population. The nations with the largest military budgets are the United States and the Soviet Union, who account for more than half of the world's military spending. According to data reported by the West, Soviet military spending accounts for approximately 14 percent of its GNP. The huge U.S. military budget has created enormous national deficits several years running, and national debts have risen sharply to \$2 trillion. This has exerted a bad influence on the economy of the Western world. In addition, the United States and the Soviet Union have also exported ammunition to the Third World, reaping staggering profits. According to statistics compiled by the Research Institute for World Peace in Stockholm, the United States and the Soviet Union accounted for 71.5 percent of the world's total volume of military hardware of \$69.715 billion in the five years from 1980 to 1984. According to statistics, Third World debt rose by \$580 billion from 1974 to 1985. Of this sum, \$250 billion were used to import ammunition from developed countries.

From the aforementioned facts and figures, we can see that the harmful effects and menace of the superpower arms race are extremely serious to mankind. Therefore, the people of various countries in the world are urgently calling on the United States and the Soviet Union to stop their arms race, lower the level of military confrontation between the East and West, thoroughly destroy nuclear weapons, completely ban space weapons, and curtail conventional arms on a large scale so as to avoid a new world war, prevent a nuclear disaster, and strive for a better tomorrow for mankind.

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RELATED ISSUES

PRC REPORTS SOVIET STRATEGIC DECEPTION AGENCY

Beijing WEN ZHAI BAO in Chinese No 362, 6 Nov 86 p 1

[Article extracted from GUOJI WENTI ZILIAO [INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS MATERIALS], No 19: "The Soviet Army's Strategic Deception Agency"]

[Text] There is a pivotal, extremely powerful special agency in the Soviet armed forces--the Strategic Deception General Department [zhanlue qipian zongju 2069 3970 2952 7499 4920 1444]--whose existence was unknown to the intelligence agencies of the world before a lieutenant from Soviet military intelligence defected to the West. Established in 1968, the Bureau is nominally subordinate to the Headquarters of the General Staff. It consists of seven departments--one of which, Department No 7, has responsibility for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks--and a central command. The latter takes charge of tracking all intelligence-gathering satellites and space stations and issuing long- and short-range forecasts concerning what times satellites pass over Soviet territory or territorial waters. Such data form the basis of military orders to subordinate units to turn off all radio transmitters and radar at appropriate times. At the same time, radio transmitters and radar charged with deception go into action by sending out misleading transmissions to enemy satellites. Western intelligence analysts estimate that the Soviet Union spends as much as \$4 billion annually on the manufacture of disinformation by the General Bureau, the KGB, and other agencies.

In addition to the above-mentioned tasks, the bureau has several other major responsibilities: camouflaging important targets and putting up bogus targets to foil enemy reconnaissance, studying news reports and then issuing false information to foreign news organizations, enforcing secrecy in the Soviet military and armaments industries to safeguard national secrets, fabricating and disseminating phony intelligence to trick the enemy into making mistaken assessments and wrong moves, and coordinating the activities of various branches of the Soviet armed forces to create favorable conditions for surprise attacks in times of war.

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